Essays in International Finance by Duan, Xiaoman



















SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 

























ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 













    ______________________________ 































































© Copyright by XIAOMAN DUAN 2017 
All Rights Reserved. 
This dissertation is dedicated to my family, whose unconditional love and encouragement 
have allowed me to reach where I am today. I dedicate it to my husband, Wenbin; without 
his love, support, and understanding, this work would not have been possible. I dedicate 
it to my parents, Zhongping Duan and Rui Cheng, and my sister, Xiaowan Duan, who 
have always been there for me. Finally, I dedicate it to my daughter, Julia Ruoshui Cao, 






I thank William Megginson, my advisor, for his encouragement, mentorship, and 
guidance throughout my doctoral program. I am grateful to Vahap Uysal, Hamed 
Mahmudi, and Wenbin Cao for the opportunity to collaborate on research over the past 
few years. I am grateful to Tor-Erik Bakke, Pradeep Yadav, Caroline Zhu, and Frances 
Ayres for their commitment and support as members of my dissertation committee.  
  
v 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................. vii 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. ix 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. x 
Chapter 1: State Capitalism and Takeover Premia: Evidence from the Oil and Gas 
Industry ................................................................................................................. 1 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 
II. Data and descriptive analysis ......................................................................... 7 
III. Acquisition premia for government bidders and private sector bidders ....... 11 
IV. Can deal and target characteristics explain the difference in acquisition 
premia? ......................................................................................................... 14 
V. Robustness .................................................................................................... 23 
VI. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 25 
Chapter 2: Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Affect Capital Structure Choices? ....... 27 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................. 27 
II. Sample selection and summary statistics ..................................................... 36 
III. The effect of policy uncertainty on capital structure decisions .................... 40 
IV. Endogeneity .................................................................................................. 46 
V. Corporate investments and capital structure decisions ................................. 49 
VI. Dynamics of capital structure adjustments in times of high economic policy 
uncertainty .................................................................................................... 51 
VII. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 55 
Chapter 3: Access to Finance, Bureaucracy, and Capital Allocation Efficiency: Evidence 
from International Data ...................................................................................... 57 
vi 
I. Introduction .................................................................................................. 57 
II. Data ............................................................................................................... 62 
III. The extent of capital misallocation ............................................................... 65 
IV. Identifying sources of misallocation: Firm-level evidence .......................... 67 
V. Identifying sources of misallocation: Industry-level evidence ..................... 79 
VI. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 80 
References ...................................................................................................................... 82 





List of Tables 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics ......................................................................................... 91 
Table 1.2: Intensity of acquisition by government-owned bidders .................................92 
Table 1.3: Deal premium measures for government bidders and private sector bidders 94 
Table 1.4: Univariate analyses for government bidders and private sector bidders ........95 
Table 1.5: Does government ownership affect deal premium? .......................................96 
Table 1.6: Do firms acquired by governments experience improvements in operating 
performance? ...................................................................................................................98 
Table 1.7: Government ownership and deal premium: Domestic deals versus cross border 
deals .................................................................................................................................99 
Table 1.8: The cross section of government ownership and deal premium ..................100 
Table 1.9: The cross section of government ownership and changes in operating 
performance ...................................................................................................................101 
Table 1.A1: Description of the Explanatory Variables in the Empirical Analyses .......102 
Table 1.A2: Determinants of Government Acquisitions ...............................................105 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics ........................................................................................107 
Table 2.2: Univariate analysis .......................................................................................108 
Table 2.3: Does economic policy uncertainty affect corporate leverage?  ....................109 
Table 2.4: Does public debt market access moderate the effect of economic policy 
uncertainty? ...................................................................................................................110 
Table 2.5: Debt issuance hazards and economic policy uncertainty .............................111 
Table 2.6: Economic policy uncertainty and debt maturity ..........................................112 
Table 2.7: Instrumental variable analysis of economic policy uncertainty ...................113 
Table 2.8: Does economic policy uncertainty affect leverage and debt issuances based on 
policy uncertainty sensitivity? .......................................................................................114 
Table 2.9: Credit spread and economic policy uncertainty ...........................................115 
Table 2.10: Simultaneous regression estimates for leverage, investment, and EPU .....116 
viii 
Table 2.11: Leverage and economic policy uncertainty: subsample analysis on firms with 
no substantial changes in investment ............................................................................117 
Table 2.12: Firm leverage and economic policy uncertainty: quantile regression 
estimation ......................................................................................................................118 
Table 2.13: Does economic policy uncertainty affect leverage spells? .........................119 
Table 2.14: Leverage and economic policy uncertainty: alternative EPU measures ....120 
Table 2.15: Market leverage and economic policy uncertainty ....................................121 
Table 2.16: Dynamic leverage adjustments and economic policy uncertainty .............122 
Table 2.B1: First Stage Instrumental Variable Regression ...........................................123 
Table 3.1: Country-level summary of MRPK ...............................................................127 
Table 3.2: Industry-level summary of MRPK ...............................................................129 
Table 3.3: Variable summaries ......................................................................................131 
Table 3.4: Univariate analysis of return to capital ........................................................132 
Table 3.5: Determinants of misallocation: Firm-level evidence ...................................133 
Table 3.6: Asymmetric effects on misallocation: Firm-level evidence .........................134 
Table 3.7: Determinants of misallocation: Industry-level evidence ..............................135 
 
ix 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: Index of economic policy uncertainty .........................................................106 
Figure 3.1: Geographical distribution of the countries ..................................................124 
Figure 3.2: Country income distribution .......................................................................125 




This dissertation is a collection of three essays on the theme of international finance. 
Chapter 1 compares the takeover premia paid by government-owned and private sector 
bidders in the oil and gas industry. Using the Schwert (1996) measure for acquisition 
premium, I find that public shareholders on average receive a 46% lower premium when 
the bidder is a government-owned firm than when it is a private sector company. 
However, the premium difference disappears once I control for deal and target 
characteristics, and this finding is robust to the concern that government bidders do not 
invest randomly. I further compare changes in target characteristics after the acquisitions 
and find no significant differences between the targets acquired by government-owned 
and private sector firms. These findings suggest that both government and private sector 
bidders are motivated by commercial objectives when they are investing in the oil and 
gas industry. 
Chapter 2 examines the role of economic policy uncertainty in capital structure 
adjustments. After accounting for macroeconomic conditions, firm and industry 
characteristics, I find that firms wait longer to issue debt and reduce leverage during 
periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Furthermore, debt maturity shortens and 
borrowing costs increase when uncertainty elevates. The effect of economic policy 
uncertainty is moderated by supply-side factors such as having access to public debt 
markets and having an investment grade bond rating. The results are robust to 
endogeneity concerns, alternative model specifications, testing strategies, and subsample 
analyses, as well as alternative measures of economic policy uncertainty. Collectively, 
the evidence suggests that the supply of capital plays an important role in corporate capital 
structure choices in times of high economic policy uncertainty. 
xi 
Chapter 3 studies the degree and determinants of capital allocation efficiency across firms 
using comprehensive firm-level survey data that covers a wide spectrum of developing 
countries. I document that capital misallocation, as measured by the dispersion in firms’ 
marginal revenue product of capital, is pervasive in firms within the same industry in a 
country. I find that limited access to finance, bureaucracy, information asymmetry, and 
gender inequality play important roles in impeding the most efficient allocation of capital 
across firms in developing countries. By employing the quantile regression technique, I 
show that these factors exert greater effects on firms that are already highly distorted (i.e., 
have too little capital). The results have direct policy implications; in particular, 
governments could achieve a more efficient allocation of capital by eliminating these 




State Capitalism and Takeover Premia: Evidence from the Oil and 
Gas Industry 
 
I.  Introduction 
The recent global wave of state capitalism marks one of the greatest transfers of 
ownership from private sectors to states, and these transfers occur disproportionally more 
in the oil and gas sector.1  In the past 30 years, the value of government purchases 
worldwide in the oil and gas sector has exceeded US$462 billion, representing 14% of 
the total value of government-involved purchases across all industries around the world.2  
Amid the growing presence of government investments, a central question is 
whether state enterprises behave differently from private firms. However, one major 
challenge faced by researchers is that government objectives are often unobservable and 
difficult to identify. I study a unique industry setting in which some state-owned 
companies have politically motivated objectives when making investments, such as 
pursuing national energy security. Such non-commercial objectives are often argued to 
be the driving force behind the rapid global expansion of state-owned oil companies from 
resource-hungry emerging economies (e.g., China and India) and thereby generate 
substantial concern from host countries (Dinc and Erel, 2013). One prominent concern is 
that state-owned companies, with the goal of securing oil reserves in mind, tend to over-
bid for assets and thus oppress healthy competition from private oil companies (the 
                                                 
1 For example, as shown by Kretzschmar et al. (2010), a growing trend of nationalization can be observed 
in the oil and gas sector. Moreover, Karolyi and Liao (2016) demonstrate that government acquirers are 
more likely to pursue targets in the oil and gas industry. 
2 These figures are the based on the author’s calculations, using data from the Thomson Reuters Securities 
Data Company’s Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. 
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political motive hypothesis). Under this hypothesis, state owned oil companies are eager 
to offer higher premia beyond the value of the targets to the acquiring firm to factor any 
additional future benefits to the society or the nation. Moreover, given their “soft budget 
constraint” and often privileged access to financial support from governments (e.g., 
Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh, 1994; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Megginson, 
Ullah and Wei, 2014), state owned oil companies are not only willing, but also able to 
pay higher acquisition premia as compared to private sector oil companies.  
Alternatively, state-owned companies may act in a commercial way, like their 
private counterparts; indeed, both types of entities might select optimal targets based on 
maximizing potential synergy gains. In this case, we should expect to see at least no 
systematic difference in the premia paid by national and private oil companies (the 
commercial motive hypothesis).  
Distinguishing between the political and commercial motive hypotheses has 
important policy implications and economic consequences. Based on the view that state-
owned oil companies serve as an arm of state policy and pay a higher premium to 
outcompete private oil companies and secure oil reserves, many host countries have 
reacted by implementing an invisible barrier to defer or even block deals initiated by 
foreign state-owned oil companies. In recent years, an increasing number of deals by 
state-owned bidders have been blocked by regulators due to political opposition in the 
host countries, which has led to losses of billions of dollars for target shareholders. A 
well-known case is the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)’s failed bid 
to purchase the U.S. oil company Unocal. Although the CNOOC put an all-cash bid on 
the table that was more than 10% higher than the eventually successful bid by Chevron, 
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its takeover attempt drew intense opposition from members of the U.S. Congress and was 
subsequently blocked. Aside from national security concerns, one important argument 
made by the host government was that the deal would have created a competitive 
disadvantage for competing private sector bidders. Despite this accusation, the CNOOC 
stressed that its objectives were purely commercial.3  
             In this study, I test the two aforementioned contrasting hypotheses by examining 
whether the premia paid by state-owned oil companies are systematically different from 
those paid by their private sector counterparts. I construct the largest possible oil and gas 
investment dataset involving public targets. My sample of deals spans from 1985 to 2015 
and consists of 133 government bidders and 928 private bidders. I measure the premia 
from pre-announcement run-up to completion (as in the work of Schwert, 1996) and 
document a sizable premium difference between the two types of acquisitions. Contrary 
to the conventional overpayment view, the premia paid by state-owned companies are 
lower compared with those paid by private companies. In my overall sample, the average 
premium for target shareholders is 13% when the bidder is a government-owned firm and 
24% when it is a private sector company. The difference is largest in the case of cross-
border acquisitions: the average premium for target shareholders is 10% when the bidder 
is a government-owned firm and 29% when it is a private company. Similar results are 
also found in relation to other measures of deal premia. 
 The difference in acquisition premia may originate from the systematic 
differences in deal and target characteristics. In the overall sample, I find that compared 
                                                 




with private bidders, government bidders acquire smaller stakes, use more cash payments 
and fewer tender offers, and do not include termination fees in as many of their deals. 
They also acquire targets that are larger and more profitable, have lower growth 
opportunities, and are undervalued the year before. According to the literature (e.g., 
Eckbo, 2009), these differences in deal and target characteristics can result in premium 
variations.    
After controlling for these deal and target characteristics, I find that the difference 
in the premia paid by government and private bidders disappears. One concern is that 
governments do not select targets randomly, which introduces selection biases. To 
address this issue, I estimate a Heckman selection regression to control for potential 
observed and unobserved factors that determine the target selection by governments ex 
ante—and the result remains intact. These findings are consistent with the commercial 
motive hypothesis, which asserts that state-owned oil companies are guided by 
commercial objectives when they invest in the oil and gas sector. 
I continue to evaluate the commercial motive hypothesis by examining the effect 
of government acquisition on target operating performance. If the political motive 
hypothesis is true, government targets (relative to private sector targets) should exhibit a 
declining operating performance post-acquisition because governments can divert 
company resources for political projects. In a difference-in-difference analysis, I find no 
significant differences between government and private sector targets in relation to 
several aspects of operating performance. Collectively, these results are consistent with 
the idea that government acquisitions are motivated by commercial objectives. 
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I further establish the robustness of my findings by showing that they are not 
sensitive to different types of government investments. I begin by demonstrating that 
neither government domestic investments nor government cross border investments are 
associated with higher premia than private sector investments. I then show that for a 
variety of government investments, the relationship between government investment and 
acquisition premium remains intact; here I consider government investment from oil poor 
countries, from common law countries, and from democratic countries. In the same vein, 
I also demonstrate that the relationship between target operating performance and 
government investments is independent from the cross-section of government 
investments.  
The present study offers new insights into government investment behaviors. 
Karolyi and Liao (2016) is a closely related study. They also document that, 
unconditionally, targets acquired by governments exhibit lower cumulative abnormal 
returns than those acquired by private sector companies, although the difference is no 
longer significant once they control for deal and target characteristics. Nonetheless, they 
only focus on government cross-border investments and do not undertake further analysis 
to explain the vanished premium difference. Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2015) 
examine the acquisition outcome of a special kind of state-owned financial vehicle: 
sovereign wealth funds. Based on short-term target shareholder gains and post-acquisition 
performance, they conclude that state ownership negatively affects firm value and 
performance. Holland (2016) documents that target firm stock prices on average react 
positively when target shareholders perceive that government investments follow 
economic motives; however, the study only focuses on government investments, which 
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it does not compare with private investments. Compared with the previously mentioned 
studies, the present work highlights that government investments are not always guided 
by political objectives and can be commercially motivated as well. This implies that the 
concern that government investments in the oil and gas sector are usually politically 
guided and thus should be approached with caution may be unwarranted. 
This study also contributes to the literature on how bidder characteristics affect 
takeover premia. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) examine acquisitions of Canadian targets 
by U.S. and Canadian bidders and find that the bidder’s relative size is a key determinant 
of the announcement-month abnormal stock return. Bargeron, Schlingeman, Stulz, and 
Zutter (2008) compare the takeover premia paid by private and publicly traded bidders 
and show that the former pay significantly lower premia than the latter (when other 
determinants of deal premia are controlled for). They conclude that the premium 
difference results from the agency cost of public companies. Levi, Li, and Zhang (2008) 
demonstrate that bid premia are lower when the bidder CEO is female. Relevant studies 
are also undertaken by Bris and Cabolis (2008), who examine the payment differential 
for domestic and foreign deals, and Starks and Wei (2013), who relate payment to 
corporate governance in the bidder’s country. 
Lastly, this study also adds to literature on both resource nationalism in general 
and government roles in the oil and gas sector in particular. Focusing on the period 2000–
2006, Kretzschmar, Kirchner, and Sharifzyanova (2010) document a trend of 
governments consolidating ownership over strategically important domestic oil and gas 
resources. They show that political risk is positively related to state ownership retention. 
Moreover, Mahdavi (2014) documents that resource nationalism is more likely to occur 
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in countries that are less democratic. Consistent with the implications of these studies, I 
find that government bidders from less democratic countries pay higher premia for 
domestic acquisitions. Most studies on government investments in the oil and gas sector 
are descriptive and subject to a limited set of countries. Jeong and Weiner (2015) consider 
a sample of Asian countries that they classify as being resource poor. While they focus 
on state ownership, they do not find that bidders from these resource-poor countries pay 
significantly higher acquisition premia. Herberg (2011) studies Asian national oil 
companies and their role in overseas investment from resource-poor countries. He 
provides anecdotal examples to demonstrate that many national oil companies appear to 
have paid very high premia in acquisition deals to obtain access to high-quality assets. In 
contrast, in my study—which is the first to systematically study the premium differences 
between investments made by national oil companies and their private counterparts in a 
large sample setting—I find no evidence of the existence of systematic overpayment. 
  
II. Data and descriptive analysis 
I obtain all announcements of acquisitions in the global oil and gas sector over the 
1985–2015 period from the Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. To identify oil and gas sector acquisitions, I restrict 
my sample to transactions in which the bidders, or their ultimate parents, have primary 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes that correspond to the oil and gas industry 
and whose targets are also in this industry. My sample is mainly composed of firms with 
the SIC code “1311: Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas” or other related oil and gas industry 
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SIC codes.4 I exclude leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, spin-offs, self-tender offers, 
exchange offers, and repurchases. Following Karolyi and Liao (2016), I also exclude 
bidders that domicile in tax havens, including the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, 
the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, and the Netherlands Antilles. I 
further restrict the sample to completed, pending, and withdrawn deals. These filters lead 
to a sample of 16,238 acquisitions in the oil and gas industry, which are worth 
approximately US$2.5 trillion in total. 
I collect several deal characteristics from the SDC, including the announcement 
date, the effective date, deal status (e.g., successful, pending, or withdrawn), whether the 
deal was cross-border, deal value, the percentage of shares acquired, and the method of 
payment (e.g., stock, cash, or mixed). I also gather bidder and target characteristics from 
the SDC, including each entities’ names, countries of domicile, four-digit primary SIC 
code, public status (e.g., subsidiary, private, public, government owned, or joint venture 
partner), and government or Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) involvement flags.   
I identify government-controlled bidders as those in which the bidder, the 
immediate, or the bidder’s ultimate parent is flagged as “government.” According to the 
SDC, “government” status includes all firms and institutions in which a government 
(directly or indirectly) owns at least a 50% stake. My sample captures transactions made 
by major state-owned oil and gas companies worldwide, such as the CNOOC, 
PetroChina, the China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation, the Indian majority state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, the 
                                                 
4 Those SIC codes include: 1321: Natural Gas Liquids, 1381: Drilling Oil and Gas Wells, 1382: Oil and 
Gas Field Exploration Services, 1389: Oil and Gas Field Services, Not Elsewhere Classified, 2911: 
Petroleum Refining, 2992: Lubricating Oils and Greases, 4922: Natural Gas Transmission, 4923: Natural 
Gas Transmission and Distribution, 4924: Natural Gas Distribution. 
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Mexican state-owned Petroleos Mexicanos, the Norwegian state-owned Statoil, the Saudi 
Arabian state-owned Aramco, and the Russian state-owned Rosneft.  
For my event studies and regression analyses, I rely on a subsample of 
transactions that involve only public targets. I obtain dividend- and split-adjusted daily 
total return indices (RI) and their associated total return country market indices from 
Datastream. I exclude targets that do not have data from Datastream as well as those that 
feature many missing or zero observations in my estimation and event window. I also 
exclude contemporaneous investments that involve the same target on the same day. The 
accounting data for my sample comes from Worldscope, and I exclude firms that have no 
or insufficient accounting information. The final sample used for event study analysis 
consists of 110 government bidder purchases and 758 private bidder purchases. 
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics concerning the number and total value of 
acquisition deals in the oil and gas sector considered in this study. It includes the total 
number of deals, the number of deals with disclosed values, the average and total deal 
values for deals with data available, the number and percentage of withdrawn deals, 
complete control deals, minority block purchases, deals involving public targets, and 
cross-border deals. It also presents deals involving bidders from oil-poor countries 
(OPCs), which are defined as countries with a dependence on foreign oil ratio that is 
greater than 50%. The table reveals that in my sample government-controlled bidders 
constitute 1,445 deals, totaling US$462 billion in value and representing approximately 
10% of all corporate-led acquisitions (14,793) and 23% of these acquisitions’ total value 
(US$2 trillion).5 
                                                 
5 Deal values are adjusted to constant 2000 USD. 
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Three findings emerge from Table 1.1. First, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in 
the oil and gas sector have a high rate of completion for both corporate and government-
controlled bidders; for example, the percentage of withdrawn deals is 4.11% for corporate 
bidders and 4.84% for government-controlled bidders. Second, both corporate and 
government-controlled bidders mostly select private (unlisted) targets; for example, a 
corporate (government-controlled) bidder chooses a publicly listed target only 14.48% 
(15.16%) of the time. Third, it is not true that government-controlled bidders from OPCs 
systematically invest more than their private sector counterparts. In fact, the percentage 
of bidders from OPCs is quite low: 26.36% for corporate bidders and 33.29% for 
government-controlled bidders.  
Despite these three similarities, corporate and government-controlled bidders also 
feature different deal characteristics. First, government-controlled bidders tend to pursue 
larger targets, which are manifested by a higher average deal value of US$699 million 
(compared to US$219 million for corporate bidders). Second, corporate bidders mostly 
engage in complete control deals (71.37%); government-controlled bidders act in the 
opposite manner, engaging in full acquisitions only 40.97% of the time. Third, only 
21.21% of the corporate-initiated deals involve minority stakes in the target firm, in 
comparison to 46.48% of the government-controlled bidders. Fourth, government-
controlled bidders invest across borders more often (53.68%) than corporate bidders 
(32.27%). 
Table 1.2 provides a detailed summary of government investments by transaction 
year and target/bidder nations. Panel A presents the number of deals, the proportion of 
the total number of deals, and the deals’ values (million USD, adjusted to constant 2000 
11 
USD). I report separately the numbers of foreign deals, domestic deals, deals from OPCs, 
and cross-border deals from OPCs. Panel B lists the 20 countries that are the largest 
targets for government investments by total deal value, whereas Panel C presents the 20 
governments that are the largest bidders by total deal value. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 1.2. First, a majority of the deals 
take place later in my sample period of 1985–2015. For example, the deals from 2001 to 
2015 account for 77% of all of the deals in the sample, and the total value of the deals for 
this sub-period account for 91% of aggregate deal values. Second, the deal counts for 
foreign and domestic deals do not differ much; they are respectively 775 and 670. Third, 
investments by OPC governments increase significantly over the study period, and most 
these investments are cross-border deals. Among the 479 deals from OPCs, 75% take 
place from 2001 to 2015 and 64% are cross border. 
   
III. Acquisition premia for government bidders and private sector bidders 
The primary deal premium measure used in this study is the first bid to completion 
(FBC) premium, which was introduced by Schwert (1996). Specifically, I estimate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from 42 days before the first bid to completion 
based on a market model. According to Schwert (1996), the advantage of this approach 
to premium estimation is that it includes all of the days when the offer to the target 
shareholders might have changed and any pre-bid run-up. This method also means it 
cannot be argued that premium differences somehow result from takeover contests 
proceeding differently for government bidders than for bidders in the private sector. 
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For robustness purposes, I also consider three- and five-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR3 and CAR5) surrounding the deal announcement dates as alternative 
premium measures. These short-term measures are free from the concern that CARs 
estimated over a long period might be sensitive to misspecification of the benchmark 
returns (Kothari and Warner, 2007). I use standard event-study methodology to calculate 
targets’ cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of government 
acquisitions. Furthermore, I employ a market model to estimate benchmark returns and 
estimate model parameters over days (-230, -30), where day (0) is the day of 
announcement of government or private acquisition. Only firms with trading data for a 
minimum of 120 days are included in my estimation. A short-term event study is much 
less sensitive to benchmark specifications (e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985), but it would 
be biased and incomplete if systematic differences exist between government and private 
acquisitions in relation to how information about acquisition likelihood and terms is 
revealed to the market before and after a bid announcement.  
 In Table 1.3, I compare the acquisition premia for both types of bidders. Panel A, 
which reports the result for the overall sample, demonstrates that among the three 
premium measures, the average premium paid by government bidders is significantly 
lower than that paid by private sector bidders. For example, based on the FBC measure, 
government bidders on average pay a premium around 13% (p<0.01) whereas private 
sector bidders on average pay around 24% (p<0.01); the difference (-11%) is significantly 
different from zero (p<0.01) based on a paired t-test. Looking at the target shareholder 
gains obtained from narrow windows around the announcement date reveals a similar 
difference. Based on CAR3, I find that the shareholders of government targets on average 
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earn a premium around 10% over the three-day window surrounding the announcement 
of an acquisition; in contrast, the shareholders of private sector targets on average earn a 
premium of 14%. A similar result is also observed for CAR5. 
 I also examine whether the premium difference depends on a deal’s 
internationality. Since a government has more influence domestically than 
internationally, this comparison can help to uncover the sources behind the difference in 
premia. Panel B of Table 1.3 presents estimates of the acquisition premia for domestic 
deals. The average FBC premium is 17% for government bidders and 22% for private 
sector bidders, but the premium difference (-5%) is not significantly different from zero. 
In contrast, consistently significant differences can be observed for the two short-horizon 
premium measures. For example, the average CAR3 (CAR5) premium is 7% (7%) for 
government bidders and 13% (14%) for private sector bidders, and the differences are 
significant at the one-percent level. In contrast, Panel C in Table 1.3 shows estimates of 
the acquisition premia for foreign deals. The average FBC premium is 10% for 
government bidders and 29% for private sector bidders; the difference (19%) is 
significant at the one-percent level. In addition, the average CAR3 premium is 12% for 
government bidders and 18% for private sector bidders, with the difference (-6%) 
significant at the five-percent level. The results based on the CAR5 premium measure are 
similar. 
In this section, I document a systematic pattern that government bidders on 
average pay significantly lower acquisition premia than private sector bidders. This 
pattern is robust to alternative measures for acquisition premium, such as the long-horizon 
FBC measure and short-horizon CAR measures. It is also independent of the 
14 
internationality of the deal, since I find evidence that the pattern holds for both domestic 
and international deals. 
IV. Can deal and target characteristics explain the difference in acquisition 
premia? 
In Panel A of Table 1.4, I compare deal characteristics for government and private 
sector bidders. My first finding relates to the percentage of target shares to be acquired. I 
find that among the 110 deals for which I have adequate non-missing observations for all 
key covariates, government bidders on average acquire 43% of target shares whereas 
private sector bidders on average acquire 70%; the difference is significant (p<0.01) 
based on a paired t-test. As Allen and Phillips (2000), Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006), 
and Liao (2014) suggest, a partial equity acquisition may inter alia result from a target 
being financially constrained. Accordingly, the fact that government bidders acquire 
smaller stakes than private sector bidders can be viewed as an acquisition of more 
financially constrained targets, which leads to lower premia.6  
Second, I find that government bidders use cash payments approximately 41% of 
the time, while private sector bidders use them significantly less frequently (31%; 
p<0.05). However, this difference is not likely the reason for the lower premia paid by 
government bidders. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that managers use cash to finance 
investments if they view them as value adding, and Travlos (1987) provides empirical 
evidence. Consequently, cash payments should lead to higher acquisition premia.  
                                                 
6 I also consider a zero-dividend dummy for targets to proxy for financial constraint, as suggested by 
Karolyi and Liao (2016). However, as incorporating this variable significantly reduces my sample size, I 
only include it later in my multivariate regression analyses. 
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Third, I discover that government bidders use fewer tender offers than private 
sector bidders (i.e., 19% versus 25%). The greater proportion of tender offers used by 
private sector bidders can explain why they on average pay higher premia, as tender offers 
are generally associated with premia that are larger (e.g., Huang and Walkling, 1987).  
Fourth, I find that fewer deals initiated by government bidders (5%) are associated 
with termination fees than those initiated by private sector bidders (13%), with the 
difference significant at the one-percent level. Officer (2003) shows that target 
termination fees lead to significantly larger acquisition premia, which suggests that this 
is another reason why private sector acquirers pay higher premia on average.  
Lastly, my findings reveal that government bidders face significantly less 
competition than private sector bidders; on average, government targets have 1.04 bids 
and private sector targets have 1.11 bids (p<0.01). Seeing as any competition in the 
bidding process can drive total gains to a target (e.g., Eckbo, 2009), the higher 
competition for private sector targets can also be a reason for the higher average premia 
paid by private sector bidders. 
In Panel B of Table 1.4, I compare target characteristics for government and 
private sector bidders. The first characteristic that I consider is target size (total assets), 
as Officer (2003) shows that target shareholders gain less when their firm is larger. I find 
that the average sizes of government and private sector targets are, respectively, US$8 
billion and US$2 billion (both in constant 2000 USD); the difference in size between 
government-acquired targets and private sector targets is significant at the one-percent 
level. This significant difference in target size can therefore be another cause of the 
difference in acquisition premia. 
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Second, I find that government targets have a significantly higher return on assets 
(ROA) than private sector targets (p<0.01). Since more profitable firms tend to 
accumulate more free cash flows, the insight of Jensen (1986) suggests that the potential 
higher agency costs of free cash flows can result in lower premia for government bidders.  
Third, I compare target leverage for both types of bidders. According to Stulz 
(1988), leverage can facilitate more concentrated ownership of a target and forces a 
successful bidder to offer a greater premium (Stulz, 1988). I find no significant 
differences: the average leverage is 20% for government targets and 18% for private 
sector targets.  
Fourth, I find that government targets have significantly lower growth 
opportunities, as measured by Tobin’s Q. For example, the average Q is 1.36 for 
government-selected targets and 1.50 for private sector selected targets, with the 
difference significant at the five-percent level. This variation in growth opportunity can 
also explain the difference in deal premia. Targets with low growth opportunities but high 
cash flows are prone to agency problems, as Jensen (1986) emphasizes. For these targets, 
mergers therefore create less wealth for their shareholders. 
Finally, in relation to the buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) for the target 
stock over the previous year of merger, I find that the average BHAR is 11% for 
government targets and -9% for private sector targets; the difference is significant 
(p<0.01). Seeing as a positive BHAR indicates undervaluation, insights from Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) suggest that undervalued targets are associated with lower premia. 
The above univariate comparisons suggest that significant differences exist 
between acquisitions by government-owned and private sector firms. The literature 
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suggests that any differences in observed deal and target characteristics can lead to the 
differences in acquisition premia. To assess the effect of government acquisition on 
acquisition premium, it is therefore critical to account for the effects of these deal and 
target characteristics. However, it is also crucial to consider the potential observed and 
unobserved factors that determine government acquisition decisions in the first place. To 
address this issue, I employ a Heckman (1979) selection regression. 
In Panel C of Table 1.4, I compare the instrumental variables that I implement in 
the Heckman selection regression. These variables should be direct determinants of 
government acquisition decisions, but not of acquisition premium. Motivated by the 
literature (e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012; Karolyi and 
Liao, 2016), I consider the level of democracy in the bidder’s country, the level of 
democracy in the target’s country, and the bidder’s legal origin. The political system in a 
country can influence the acquisition behaviors of government-owned bidders. In 
particular, in autocratic countries, politicians who manage state-owned firms face less 
obstacles in decision makings; consequently, state-owned bidders from autocratic 
countries tend to make more acquisitions on average. I also include the level of 
democracy in the target’s country, because Karolyi and Liao (2016) point out that a larger 
difference between acquirer and target countries in their political systems would be 
associated with a lower rate of government-led acquisition activity. Lastly, bidder’s legal 
origin can also influence government-led acquisition activity. I expect a negative relation 
between government investment and common law, because it would be more difficult for 
state owners to divert economic resources for social and political agendas in common law 
countries.  
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The results in Table 1.4 reveal several insights regarding government acquisition 
decisions. First, government bidders are more likely to select targets that are domiciled 
in less democratic countries. For example, the average polity score is 7.89 for the 
countries in which government targets are domiciled and 9.72 for those in which private 
sector targets are domiciled; the difference is significant at the one-percent level. Second, 
governments of less democratic countries are more likely to make acquisitions. For 
example, the average polity score is 3.39 for countries where government bidders come 
from and 9.61 for countries where private sector bidders originate; the difference is 
significant at the one-percent level. Third, government bidders are more likely to stem 
from civil law countries. For example, only 45% of the government bidders are from 
common law countries as opposed to 85% of the private sector bidders; the difference is 
significant at the one-percent level. 
 My comparison of deal and target characteristics suggests that government 
ownership is not the only reason why shareholders of government targets receive lower 
premium than shareholders of private sector selected targets. To investigate whether 
government ownership in the bidder per se has any effect on acquisition premium, I 
conduct a battery of regressions. The dependent variable is acquisition premium, and I 
employ all three premium measures for robustness purposes. I focus on an indicator 
variable for acquisitions by government-owned companies. For the benchmark 
regressions, I include the deal and target characteristics that are analyzed earlier. I also 
include two macroeconomic variables that can influence acquisition premium. The first 
one is per capita GDP of target nation. The second one is the real oil price. In the second 
set of regressions, I include three additional deal and target characteristics that are also 
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identified by previous studies (e.g., Leuz, Lins, and Warnock, 2010; Karolyi and Liao, 
2016) as determinants of acquisition premium for robustness purposes. These 
characteristics are minority block, zero dividend, and high close-held shares. In my third 
set of regressions, I include the inverse Mills ratio 𝜆  from the probit regression on 
government acquisition decision (the estimation result for the probit regression is 
included in Table A2 in the appendix). Including the inverse Mills ratio enables me to 
control for the observed and unobserved characteristics that determine government 
acquisition decisions and thus to obtain consistent coefficient estimates. Furthermore, 
seeing as my sample spans multiple years, I include year-fixed effects to control for the 
effects of time-specific market-wide factors on acquisition premium. In the same spirit, I 
employ a year-cluster robust standard error estimator to mitigate the concern that time-
specific market-wide factors may cause error terms to be correlated.  
 Table 1.5 reports the results of the regression. The coefficient estimates for 
government acquisition are insignificant in all three sets of regression specifications and 
for all three measures of acquisition premium, which indicates that government 
acquisitions are not responsible per se for the lower premia. The fact that the shareholders 
of government targets receive lower premia is explained by the characteristics of the deals 
and targets themselves. This finding suggests that government acquisitions in the oil and 
gas sector are motivated by the same objective as private sector acquisitions, the 
commercial objective.  
 The coefficient estimates for control variables are broadly consistent with the 
univariate analysis results presented in Table 1.4. The positive and significant coefficient 
for Sought suggests that the acquisition premium increases with the percentage of target 
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shares being acquired. Moreover, the positive and significant coefficient for Cash Deal 
suggests that target shareholders on average receive a higher premium if they are paid 
with cash instead of stock. Tender Offer also has a positive and significant coefficient, 
which suggests that tender offers can lead to higher target shareholder gains. The negative 
and significant coefficient for log(TA) indicates that shareholders of larger targets on 
average receive a lower acquisition premium. The negative and significant coefficient for 
BHAR suggests that target shareholders on average receive a lower premium if their 
stocks are undervalued in the year prior to the merger announcement.  
Turning to the second regression specification, columns (4) to (6) in Table 1.5 
reveal that the coefficients for Minority Block, Zero Dividend, and High Close-Held 
Share are insignificant. As including these three variables also reduces the sample size 
from 868 to 520, we cannot rule out the possibility that the reduced statistical power 
associated with the smaller sample size is the reason for the insignificant estimates. In the 
same spirit, this possibly reduced statistical power also supports the initial decision taken 
to exclude these three variables from the study’s main analyses. 
I find consistent evidence that government acquisitions are not associated with 
significantly different acquisition premia. This agrees with the commercial objective 
hypothesis that government acquisitions are motivated by the principle of profit 
maximization, similar to private sector acquisitions. To further explore the merit of 
commercial objective hypothesis, I examine whether government acquisitions (relative to 
private sector acquisitions) are associated with significant changes in five target 
characteristics that provide information about acquisition motives.  
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The first two characteristics are measures of profitability, namely return on asset 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The political objective hypothesis claims that 
government-acquired targets should experience declines in profitability due to 
governments diverting business resources to social and political agendas. The commercial 
objective hypothesis suggests the opposite; government-acquired targets should either 
experience no declines in profitability or experience improvements in profitability.  
The next three characteristics that I consider are leverage, investment, and cash 
holding. First, in relation to leverage, it is possible for government-acquired targets to 
exhibit higher leverage in that governments, if motivated politically, may want to tighten 
controls over targets by increasing leverage and retiring existing shares. This is 
particularly relevant given that government bidders in my sample on average acquire non-
majority shares of the targets (43%, as shown in Table 1.4). In contrast, the commercial 
objective hypothesis suggests the opposite. Second, in the presence of external financial 
frictions, financing decisions and investment decisions become interdependent (e.g., 
Almeida and Campello, 2007; Hennessy and Whited, 2007). In this case, if government 
acquisitions are motivated by political agendas (e.g., reducing the rate of unemployment), 
it is possible to see a higher level of investment on average in government-acquired 
targets. At the same time, on average a lower level of cash holding and a higher level of 
leverage should also be visible. This should not occur if government acquisitions are 
motivated commercially. 
To measure the change in a characteristic, I consider the difference between its 
pre- and post-acquisition N-Year averages; to be robust, I let N range from 1 to 3. In Table 
1.6, I present estimation results for the set of difference regressions I conduct on target 
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characteristics. The dependent variables from Panels A to E are changes in ROA, ROE, 
leverage, investment, and Cash/TA for each target. In each panel, Columns (1) to (3) show 
the changes measured over the windows for one, two, and three years before and after the 
acquisitions. The variable of interest is the indicator of government acquisition. To 
account for potential observed and unobserved factors that determine governmental 
selection ex ante, I include the inverse Mills ratio (as before). This regression setting 
resembles the common difference-in-difference regression setting. Nevertheless, by 
aggregating the time series for each target, my regression is not subject to the serial 
correlation problem that is highlighted by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). 
Lastly, since I collapse a panel regression into a cross-section regression, I employ the 
heteroskedastic robust standard error estimator to draw inferences related to statistical 
significance. 
The coefficient estimates for government acquisition in Table 1.6 are 
unequivocally inconsistent with the political motive hypothesis but are consistent with 
the commercial motive hypothesis. For example, in Panels A and B, where the dependent 
variables are ROA and ROE, the coefficients for government acquisition are not 
significantly negative, as should be the case according to the political motive hypothesis. 
Instead, in some cases I even find positive and significant estimates, which indicates that 
government acquisitions sometimes result in higher profitability relative to private sector 
acquisitions. This partly improved profitability can be interpreted as a manifestation of 
the value of the political connection created by government acquisition (e.g., Faccio, 
2006) and is consistent with the commercial objective hypothesis. In Panels C and D, the 
coefficients for government acquisition are not significantly positive for leverage and 
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investment, as otherwise predicted by the political motive hypothesis. In Panel E, I find 
positive coefficients for government acquisition in relation to cash holding; the 
coefficients for changes measured over longer horizons (i.e., two and three years pre- and 
post-acquisition) are significant (p<0.1). This finding is again inconsistent with the 
political objective hypothesis. 
V. Robustness 
 In this section, I establish the robustness of my main results. A primary concern 
is that my finding is driven by a particular type of government investments. This concern 
is valid because government investments in my sample are heterogeneous. For instance, 
it is possible that government domestic investments and foreign investments are 
motivated differently. To address this concern, I demonstrate in this section that my main 
results remain intact for the entire cross section of government investments. 
To begin with, I study separately the relationship between government acquisition 
and acquisition premium for domestic deals and cross border deals and report the results 
in Table 1.7. In the first three columns, I report the estimates for domestic deals based on 
all three measures of acquisition premium. In the last three columns, I report the estimates 
for cross border deals. I incorporate all the explanatory variables from Table 1.5, and I 
further control for the selection problem by including the inverse Mills ratio. The 
coefficient estimates for the indicator of government acquisition are insignificant in 
nearly all models; it is marginally significant (p=0.08) for Model (1), which is based on 
domestic deals and the FBC measure for acquisition premium. Collectively, these 
estimates indicate that for both domestic and cross border acquisitions, government 
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bidders do not pay significantly higher premia than private sector acquirers. This finding 
therefore is consistent with the commercial objective hypothesis. 
Next, I incorporate several interaction terms with the indicator of government 
acquisition to capture the entire cross section of government acquisition. Specifically, I 
consider an indicator of cross border acquisitions, an indicator of bidder nation to be of 
common law origin, a variable that measures the level of democracy of the bidder nation, 
an indicator of bidder nation to be oil poor, and a variable that measures the percentage 
of stake in the target to be acquired. In this case, by incorporating the interaction terms 
with these variables, I can study the relationships between acquisition premium and 
different types of government acquisition.  
Table 1.8 provides test results. In particular, I estimate an extension of the second 
regression specification (also with the inverse Mills ratio) in Table 1.5 by including the 
interaction terms of government acquisition as well as controls. The coefficient estimates 
for the interaction terms are insignificant in almost all cases. These estimates indicate that 
the insignificant relationship between acquisition premium and government investment 
is not sensitive to the particular type of government investment; government investments 
are not associated with higher acquisition premia, regardless of the particular type of 
government investment. This finding therefore provides further support to the 
commercial motive hypothesis. 
I show that the relationships between government investment and changes in 
target characteristics are not sensitive to the particular type of government investment. In 
Table 1.9, I present estimation results for the set of regressions on changes in target 
characteristics and the cross section of government acquisitions (as in Table 8). The 
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dependent variables from Panels A to E are changes in ROA, ROE, leverage, investment, 
and Cash/TA for each target. However, instead of showing the results for all three time 
windows (as in Table 6), I focus on the changes measured only over the two-year window 
before and after the acquisitions. The reason is that it is generally less likely for the effect 
of government ownership (if it exists at all) to be reflected immediately, especially for 
sticky variables such as leverage and investment. On the other hand, the loss of 
information is significantly increased if I consider three years after the acquisitions, which 
further reduces the statistical power.7 Next, the variables of interest are the interaction 
terms with government acquisition; as before I also include the inverse Mills ratio. Lastly, 
I employ the heteroskedastic robust standard error estimator to draw inferences in relation 
to statistical significance, as discussed above. 
The coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are insignificant in almost all 
cases. These estimates suggest that government-acquired targets do not exhibit significant 
changes in their characteristics relative to their private sector counterparts, regardless of 
the type of government investment. Consequently, this finding provides further support 
to the commercial motive hypothesis. 
VI. Conclusions 
In this study, I examine whether the takeover premia paid to target shareholders 
differ when the bidder is a state-owned oil company instead of a private sector bidder. I 
first document a pervasive pattern based on my univariate analysis; government-owned 
bidders on average pay significantly lower premia than corporate bidders. The average 
                                                 
7 The results for the one- and three-year windows are available from the author upon request. 
26 
excess premium paid by private sector bidders can be up to twice as high in the case of 
cross-border deals. 
  I provide robust evidence that government ownership per se does not result in 
significantly lower premia. I find that compared with private sector bidders, government 
bidders acquire smaller stakes, use more cash payments and fewer tender offers, and 
include termination fees in fewer deals. In addition, government bidders acquire targets 
that are larger and more profitable, have lower growth opportunities, and are undervalued 
the year before. As suggested in the literature (Eckbo, 2009), these deal and target 
characteristics are associated with lower deal premia. After accounting for these 
characteristics’ effects on deal premia, I find that government acquisition is no longer a 
significant determinant. This finding is further substantiated by the Heckman regression 
that addresses the target selection issue associated with government investments.   
To further explore the commercial motive hypothesis, I examine the effect of 
government acquisition on post-acquisition operating performance. In a difference-in-
difference analysis, I find no significant differences between government and private 










Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Affect Capital Structure Choices?8 
 
I. Introduction 
Fiscal, regulatory and monetary policies of governments influence the business 
environment and affect corporate decisions (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Graham et al., 
2015). Moreover, given the intuition of real options analysis, uncertainty about 
government policy is likely to affect corporate choices.9 While previous studies have 
documented a negative effect of economic policy uncertainty on corporate investment 
decisions (Rodrik, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 
2016), there remains a limited understanding of the effect of economic policy uncertainty 
on a firm’s financing decisions. 
This paper examines the link between economic policy uncertainty and capital 
structure. Specifically, we study how economic policy uncertainty influences adjustments 
and the nature of corporate debt. There are at least two channels through which economic 
policy uncertainty can affect capital structure decisions.  
First, economic policy uncertainty can affect corporate financing policies through 
the capital supply channel.10 In periods of high economic policy uncertainty, investors 
reduce funding or shift their capital supply to relatively safe assets, generating a credit 
crunch for firms in general and for risky firms in particular. Furthermore, the cost of 
                                                 
8 This chapter is based on the collaborative work with Wenbin Cao and Vahap Uysal.  
9 Olivier Blanchard, chief economist of IMF, further suggested that policy makers should tailor policies to 
reduce uncertainty as the uncertainty has real effects on economic agents. The Economist, January 29, 2009, 
“Nearly nothing to fear but fear itself”. 
10 Among others, Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Massa, Yasuda and Zhang (2013), Custodio, Ferreira 
and Laureano (2013), and Saretto and Tookes (2013) show that nature of credit supply affects a firm’s 
capital structure.  
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borrowing increases as investors require higher risk premium in periods of higher 
economic policy uncertainty (Pastor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013; Brogaard and Detzel, 
2015). Thus, firms are more likely to wait longer to issue debt and reduce leverage when 
economic policy uncertainty increases. Finally, if firms do borrow during periods of high 
economic policy uncertainty, creditors are likely to shorten the debt maturity as long-term 
debt is riskier relative to short-term debt (Supply of Capital Hypothesis). 
Second, economic policy uncertainty may also lower the demand of firms to issue 
debt. An increase in uncertainty regarding economic policy generates uncertainty on the 
firms’ future cash flows. The dynamic capital structure theories (e.g., Fischer et al., 1989; 
Goldstein et al., 2001; Strebulaev, 2007) predict that increased cash flow uncertainty will 
decrease the optimal leverage for a firm and increase its refinancing threshold. As firms 
rebalance their capital structures when their profitability exceeds the refinancing 
thresholds, an increased financing threshold leads firms to wait longer to issue debt. 
Furthermore, firms are likely to decrease debt ratios during periods of high economic 
policy uncertainty. Increased uncertainty on future cash flows will also lead firms to 
borrow short-term to match the timing of cash flows and debt obligations (Demand for 
Capital Hypothesis). 
To assess the effect of economic policy uncertainty on capital structure decisions, 
we employ the measure of the economic policy uncertainty index (EPU, hereafter) 
developed by Baker et al. (2013). This index incorporates media coverage of policy 
uncertainty, temporal federal tax codes set to expire, and divergences in analyst economic 
forecasts on future government purchases and future inflation. Using EPU has several 
advantages over employing election years as a proxy for economic policy uncertainty 
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(Brogaard and Detzel, 2015). First, studies using election years implicitly assume that 
uncertainty completely resolves after elections. In fact, a divided house may amplify and 
prolong the uncertainty even well after the elections. For example, after the elections in 
2012, the debt ceiling debate within the divided political system led to government shut 
down in 2013 in the U.S. In contrast, EPU is a continuous measure and does not assume 
the complete resolution of the uncertainty at any point in time. Second, EPU is readily 
available and comparable over time, whereas the elections occur infrequently. It is also 
difficult to compare the level of uncertainty among elections. For example, historically 
high level of uncertainty of the presidential election between Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton in 2016 is not comparable to low level of uncertainty in 1996 when the 
Republican Party gave up on its presidential nominee Bob Dole.11 Thus, several recent 
studies have selected EPU to evaluate the effect of policy uncertainty on asset pricing and 
corporate policies (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2013; Gulen and Ion, 2016; Brogaard and 
Detzel, 2015). 
Our paper provides novel and robust evidence documenting significant effects of 
economic policy uncertainty on capital structure adjustments. After accounting for the 
effects of economic conditions, firm and industry characteristics on capital structure, we 
find that firms have lower debt ratios when economic policy uncertainty increases. Firms 
are also less likely to issue debt in periods of high economic policy uncertainty. If they 
do issue debt during these periods, corporate debt maturity shortens. These findings are 
consistent with both contraction of available funds (Supply of Capital Hypothesis) and 
lower demand of firms for capital (Demand for Capital Hypothesis).  
                                                 
11 See for example “How Bob Dole’s Dream Was Dashed” by Adam Nagourney and Elizabeth Kolbert on 
the New York Times on November 8 1996. 
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We also conduct a battery of tests to disentangle supply and demand mechanisms 
of capital structure. Specifically, we examine whether factors that are found to be 
associated with the supply channel of capital structure moderate the effect of economic 
policy uncertainty on leverage. Previous studies show that differences in access to public 
debt markets in general (Faulkender and Peterson, 2006) and bond ratings in particular 
(Erel et al., 2012) generate variations in the supply of capital for firms. In the light of 
Faulkender and Peterson (2006), we study whether firms with better access to finance, 
measured with public debt market access, would be less sensitive to changes in economic 
policy uncertainty when adjusting capital structures. We find that firms without public 
debt market access are less likely to issue debt relative to rated firms during periods of 
high economic policy uncertainty. Notably, debt maturity shortens for non-rated firms 
even further when economic policy uncertainty increases.12 In examining the differences 
in capital structure adjustments among rated firms, we also find that investment grade 
firms are less sensitive to changes in economic policy uncertainty relative to non-
investment grade firms. These findings are consistent with the idea that investors shift 
investments towards safer assets, generating frictions in the supply of capital which are 
partially alleviated by having (preferential) access to public debt markets. Overall, these 
findings lend support to the Supply of Capital Hypothesis, while they are difficult to 
square with the Demand for Capital Hypothesis. 
We also study endogeneity concerns in the paper. If economic policy uncertainty 
and capital structure adjustments are either determined simultaneously or are 
codetermined by unobserved factors, then the economic policy uncertainty may not be 
                                                 
12 Custodio, Ferreira and Laureano (2013) also show that changes in the credit supply led to decrease in 
utilization of long-term corporate debt in the U.S. 
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the catalyst of the findings. To address this concern, we conduct two separate analyses. 
First, we estimate instrumental variable (IV) regressions where we employ the level of 
political polarization in the United States Senate as an instrument for economic policy 
uncertainty, as motivated by the political science literature (e.g., McCarty, 2012). Our IV 
regressions reveal a negative and significant effect of economic policy uncertainty on 
firm leverage. Second, we assess whether firms with greater economic policy exposures 
are more sensitive to economic policy uncertainty. If the previously documented effect 
of EPU is principally driven by an omitted variable, then the general economic policy 
sensitivity should have no effect on the relationship between leverage and EPU. We 
identify defense and energy industries as being relatively more sensitive to economic 
policy as suggested by Goldman et al. (2009). We find that firms in defense and energy 
industries reduce their debt ratios more than firms in other industries when economic 
policy uncertainty elevates. Collectively, these findings lend further support to the view 
that economic policy uncertainty plays a distinct role in capital structure decisions.  
It is possible that the previously documented relationship between capital 
structure adjustments and economic policy uncertainty is driven by changes in corporate 
investments. During periods of high economic policy uncertainty, firms are less sensitive 
to demand shocks and are less likely to make investments (Bloom et al., 2007), which 
may reflect itself as lower demand for debt financing. Due to a reduced demand for debt 
financing, leverage may also decrease when economic policy uncertainty elevates. We 
conduct several tests to mitigate this concern. First, we study the relationship between 
EPU and the yields to corporate bonds at both the aggregate and firm levels to assess 
whether economic policy uncertainty increases borrowing costs. At the aggregate level 
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in our time series regression, we find that the average credit spread – the average yield 
difference between Baa-rated bonds and that of Aaa-rated bonds – is positively related to 
the measure of economic policy uncertainty. At the firm level in our cross-section 
regressions, the bond issuance credit spread – the yield difference between a newly issued 
corporate bond and that of a matched U.S. Treasury Bond – is positively related to EPU. 
The positive association between EPU and yields suggests that economic policy 
uncertainty leads to increases in borrowing costs for firms. Furthermore, coupled with the 
finding of shortened maturity, these findings indicate a contraction of capital supply in 
periods of high economic policy uncertainty, lending further support to the supply-based 
theories of capital structure. Second, we estimate a simultaneous regression system 
involving leverage, investment, and EPU. We find that the effect of economic policy 
uncertainty on leverage is still negative after we allow for investment and leverage to be 
determined simultaneously. Third, we examine whether firms change their capital 
structures even when they do not change their investments. We find that firms continue 
to reduce debt even when they do not change their investments. In sum, these findings 
collectively suggest that changes in capital structure during high economic policy 
uncertainty are unlikely to be driven by variations in corporate investments. 
We also examine the effect of economic policy uncertainty on the dynamics of 
migrations among capital structure groups by employing quantile regression. Unlike 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions, which estimate the effects of changes in 
independent variables on the conditional mean of the dependent variable, quantile 
regressions estimate that effect on conditional quantiles, such as median or quartiles, of 
the distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker, 2005). This estimation method 
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allows us to assess whether the effect of economic policy uncertainty on a firm’s capital 
structure depends on the firm’s level of leverage. We find that firms in all leverage groups 
reduce their debt ratios when economic policy uncertainty increases. However, sensitivity 
to economic policy uncertainty varies among capital structure groups. Specifically, the 
economic policy uncertainty has stronger effects on highly leveraged firms. This finding 
suggests that firms in the fourth quartile decrease their debt ratios more than the firms in 
the third quartile; thereby, firms in the third quartile fill the exodus of highly leveraged 
firms. Similar leverage adjustment speeds in the first and second quartile firms do not 
lead to significant migration among firms in these quartiles. 
We further study the dynamic nature of migration among leverage groups by 
employing duration analysis in the spirit of Leary and Roberts (2005). Duration analysis 
allows us to estimate the effect of economic policy uncertainty on the lengths of the time 
periods for which firms are highly leveraged, while controlling for traditional 
determinants of capital structure. It also captures the notion that firms adjust capital 
structures infrequently (Leary and Roberts, 2005). We find that during periods of high 
economic policy uncertainty, highly leveraged firms are more likely to move towards low 
leverage regimes, while firms in the lowest leverage quartile tend to remain in their 
groups for extended periods. These findings are consistent with the higher speed of 
leverage adjustment for highly leveraged firms as reported in the quintile regression. We 
also find that the effect of economic policy uncertainty is more prominent for firms that 
do not have (preferential) access to debt markets. Overall, these findings are consistent 
with the supply-based theories of capital structure. 
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Our results are robust to alternative model specifications, testing methods, and 
subsample analyses. In addition to implementing book leverage, we use market leverage 
and target-adjusted leverage. Moreover, we estimate probit models to evaluate partial 
effects of economic policy uncertainty on probabilities to issue debt. To ensure that small 
firms and high-growth firms do not drive our results, we further conduct subsample 
analyses based on firm size and the market-to-book ratio. Our results are also robust to 
alternative measures of economic policy uncertainty and macroeconomic conditions. 
Overall, these tests further substantiate the findings of the paper.  
Our study contributes to discussion on the supply and the demand mechanisms of 
capital structure. Faulkender and Peterson (2006) argue that supply of debt plays an 
important role in capital structure decisions by showing that traditional determinants of 
capital structure which proxy for the demand of firms for capital do not fully explain the 
differences in capital structure choices of rated and non-rated firms. In their recent work, 
Graham et al. (2015) also show that firm characteristics are not sufficient to explain the 
changes in capital structure choices. Furthermore, Choe et al. (1993), Korajczyk and Levy 
(2003), and Erel et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence on how firms adjust their capital 
structures in response to changes in non-firm characteristics including the business cycles 
and macroeconomic conditions. In particular, Erel et al. (2012) argue that the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on capital structure is consistent with the supply channel of 
capital structure theories. The present paper is distinguished from these papers principally 
by providing new insights on how firms make financing decisions in response to the 
uncertainty in economic policies. By documenting the significant effect of economic 
policy uncertainty on capital structure choices, the paper shows that uncertainty plays a 
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distinct and independent role in the formation and timing of capital structure and that an 
important source of the uncertainty is generated by policy makers. 
 The dynamic nature of financing decisions studied in this paper is also related to 
recent studies that draw attention to leverage regime stability (Lemmon et al., 2008; 
DeAngelo and Roll, 2015). These studies show that different groups of firms may 
rebalance capital structure in fundamentally different ways; firms are intrinsically labeled 
as seeking high leverage or low leverage. However, these studies diverge on the relative 
time lengths of stable leverage regimes.13 Our paper relates to these studies by showing 
that economic policy uncertainty affects the time length of a stable leverage regime in an 
asymmetric way. For instance, economic policy uncertainty increases the length of the 
low leverage regime while decreasing the length of the high leverage regime. 
Furthermore, the amplifying effects of policy risk exposure and inability to access debt 
markets on the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and the capital structure 
decisions also suggest that financial frictions contribute to firms’ migrations among debt 
regimes. Overall, the findings in this paper contribute to studies on capital structure 
stability by showing that leverage stability depends on the level of economic policy 
uncertainty and how firms internalize the uncertainty. 
This paper also contributes to existing studies examining the effect of economic 
policy uncertainty on corporate decisions. Yonce (2009), Julio and Yook (2012), and 
Gulen and Ion (2016) show that firms cut investment anticipating economic policy 
uncertainty. By showing the effect of economic policy uncertainty on capital structure 
                                                 
13 Lemmon et al. (2008) show that firms tend to remain in their initial leverage quartiles for a long time. 
DeAngelo and Roll (2015) find that most firms switch among different quartiles over time rather than 
staying in one quartile. 
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decisions, our study illustrates that the effect of economic policy uncertainty is not limited 
to corporate investments, but extends to corporate financing choices.  
 
II. Sample selection and summary statistics 
We obtain quarterly U.S. publicly traded firms’ data from 1986 to 2015 from 
Compustat for our leverage adjustment analysis.14 Following Leary and Roberts (2005) 
and Halling, Yu and Zechner (2016), we use quarterly data to explore more time series 
variations. Based on previous studies on capital structure (e.g., Hovakimian et al., 2001; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008), we exclude financial firms (Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) 6000–6999) and regulated utilities (SIC 4900–4999). We 
exclude firms with missing or negative values on total assets, total debt, and market 
equity, as well as firms with less than 10 million dollars in total assets. All the ratios, such 
as EBITDA/TA, Market-to-Book, and Tangible Asset/TA, are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1% level to mitigate the effect of outliers. In this paper, following DeAngelo and 
Roll (2015), we primarily focus on Book Leverage in part because book values are 
relatively more stable and more accurately reveal debt adjustments. Furthermore, 
managers may focus on book values rather than market values in assessing capital 
structure (Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001). Regardless, we report results based on 
Market Leverage in the robustness section and they remain intact.  
In our sample, we restrict Book Leverage to be in the unit interval. Based on Leary 
and Roberts (2005), firms are also required to have at least 16 continuous quarterly 
                                                 
14We use this time period because the Economic Uncertainty Index data starts from 1985 and the stock 
market volatility index, VIX, starts from 1986. 
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observations to conduct the duration analysis. Our final sample contains 5,929 unique 
firms and 329,834 firm-quarter observations. 
The main explanatory variable is the economic policy uncertainty index (EPU) 
from Baker et al. (2013). EPU aggregates three sources of information. The first 
component is the news coverage about policy uncertainty. Specifically, terms related to 
economic uncertainty are searched in 10 major newspapers and the counts are 
summarized. The second component is from reports by the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) that compile lists of temporary federal tax code provisions. The third component 
draws on the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters 
on future government purchases and future inflation. Thus, EPU captures the overall 
economic policy-related uncertainty, rather than a specific type of government related 
uncertainty (fiscal, monetary, social security).  
To analyze the cost of debt in the robustness section, we obtain the credit spread 
time series data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, bond issuance data from 
Mergent FISD, and stock return data from CRSP for the same period. For the bond 
issuance data in particular, we collect the issuer ID, the date of issuance, the issuance 
yield, the maturity of an issue, the S&P rating of an issue, and the Treasury bond yield 
matched by the maturity of the corporate issue. We apply several filters to the raw data 
set, excluding observations with missing offering yield, offering date, maturity, and 
security level. We further remove observations with non-US or bankrupt issuers, and 
those with puttable or convertible features. After matching bond issuance data with 
macroeconomic variables, Compustat, CRSP, and bond ratings, we have 6,869 new debt 
issues in the U.S. between 1985 and 2015. Lastly, in light of Campbell and Taksler 
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(2003), we include Idiosyncratic Volatility, measured as the stock volatility of individual 
stock returns in excess of market return volatility, as a control variable in our firm level 
credit spread analysis.   
Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. In 
Panel A, we summarize firm characteristics. The Book Leverage has an average of 0.26 
with a standard deviation of 0.24 around the mean. The Market-to-Book ratio has a mean 
of 1.92 and a median of 1.16. The mean Firm Size in our sample is $523 million. These 
statistics are similar to those in previous studies including Lemmon et al. (2008), Frank 
and Goyal (2009), and DeAngelo and Roll (2015). In addition, only 29% of the firms in 
our sample possess a credit rating, which is consistent with Faulkender and Peterson 
(2006). In Panel B, we summarize the economic variables used in our analysis. The EPU 
index has a time series mean of 1.07 with a standard deviation of 0.31 around the mean.15 
The (scaled) VIX index series is averaged at 21 percent with a standard deviation of 8 
percent. In Panel C, we describe the bond issuance sample. Credit Spread, the average 
yield difference between Baa-rated bonds and that of Aaa-rated bonds, has an average of 
1 percentage point. In the bond level data, the average Offering Yield is 7.43 percentage 
points while the mean matched Treasury yield is 4.75 percentage points. Furthermore, the 
average Maturity of these corporate bonds is around 10.72 years and the standard 
deviation is around 7.86 years. The average S&P credit rating of these bonds is between 
A- and BBB+. These summary statistics for bond issuances are consistent with previous 
studies that examine bond level data (e.g., Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012). 
                                                 
15 We scale the original EPU index by dividing it by 100. 
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We next examine whether EPU is correlated with traditional macroeconomic 
indicators in the time series. It is possible that EPU may be high during economic 
downtowns and thereby may be another indicator for economic slowdown. Thus, we 
further study the relation between the US Monthly EPU Index data and the recessions 
that are identified by the NBER. We use the mean of the index over a quarter to match 
with our firm data. The data series is normalized by 100 to be comparable with other firm 
characteristics in scale. In Figure 2.1, we report the time series plot of the index together 
with the NBER dated recessions. EPU is typically counter cyclical. However, it continues 
to be high even in non-recession years including 2003 and 2011. These findings are 
consistent with Baker et al. (2013) and provide preliminary evidence that EPU is distinct 
from general business cycle variables. Besides, per Baker et al. (2013), the EPU index 
and the VIX index are not perfectly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.58. Thus, 
it is important to note that economic policy uncertainty and stock market volatility are 
two distinct yet closely related aspects of the general uncertainty faced by firms. 
Figure 2.1 also reveals benefits of using a continuous measure over a discrete 
measure. Prior studies (e.g., Julio and Yook, 2012) have used indicators of election years 
as a proxy for policy uncertainty; however, the indicator approach does not capture 
economic policy uncertainty in non-election years, and such uncertainty can be high. For 
example, EPU reached its peak during the debt ceiling debate in a non-election year of 
2011. Thus, economic policy uncertainty is not necessarily resolved right after elections 
and may even increase during the post-election period. 
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III. The effect of policy uncertainty on capital structure decisions 
We begin our inquiries with a set of univariate analyses of leverage over high and 
low EPU periods. We define high EPU if the EPU index is in the top EPU quartile and 
low EPU otherwise. In Panel A of Table 2.2, we report the mean and median of leverage 
for low and high periods of EPU. The mean of leverage is 0.248 in low EPU while it is 
0.232 in high EPU. The difference in leverage between these periods is also statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, the median debt ratios are higher in low EPU 
periods relative to high EPU periods (0.225 vs. 0.204) and the difference in debt ratios 
continues to be statistically significant. Taken together, these results indicate that firms 
have lower debt ratios in periods with high EPU.  
Next, we examine whether the negative relation between economic policy 
uncertainty and leverage depends on firm characteristics. Panel B of Table 2.2 reports 
mean debt ratios by EPU periods and firm size quartiles. While mean leverage 
incrementally increases with firm size, firms during high EPU periods have lower debt 
ratios for each firm size quartile. We continue to find lower debt ratios during high EPU 
periods when we sort the data by leverage in Panel C. Furthermore, Panel D shows that 
the results remain intact in three out of four Market-to-Book quartiles when we sort the 
data by Market-to-Book ratio. Collectively, these findings indicate that firm size, leverage 
and Market-to-Book ratio are unlikely to confound the effect of EPU on the debt ratio, 
while also supporting our conjecture that economic policy uncertainty influences capital 
structure.    
Finally, we examine whether the negative relation between economic policy 
uncertainty and leverage depends on the election year. Panel E reports the mean leverage 
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by EPU and election years. The effect of EPU on the debt ratio continues to hold in both 
election and non-election years. However, the effect of election on debt is not uniform. 
That is, there is no difference in leverage in election and non-election years during periods 
of low EPU. Elections have a significant effect on leverage only when EPU is high. These 
findings suggest that differences in leverage in election and non-election years are 
generated in part by increased economic policy uncertainty, while further supporting the 
view that EPU is a distinct determinant of capital structure.  
We also conduct a multivariate analysis including several factors that are not 
accounted for in the univariate analysis, but may potentially affect leverage. Table 2.3 
reports the coefficient estimates for the regressions of EPU on leverage. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and to clustering within firm over time. In these 
regressions, we include a variety of variables for the state of the economy. As overall 
economic conditions, especially the business cycle, can exert a strong effect on a firm’s 
capital structure decisions, we add NBER recession dummies in our analyses. To account 
for the effect of overall uncertainty in the capital markets, our analysis includes the S&P 
100 volatility index (VIX). Collectively, this set of control variables allows us to segregate 
the effects of economic policy uncertainty and economic conditions on capital structure 
decisions. 
We also account for several factors that are found to be important determinants of 
capital structure choices in previous studies (e.g., Hovakimian et al., 2001; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009). For example, we include 
the natural logarithm of the total value of book assets as a proxy for Firm Size. As large 
firms are more diversified and have less volatile cash flows, large firms are likely to have 
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higher debt ratios (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Furthermore, we control for growth 
opportunities proxied by the Market-to-Book ratio, since firms with more growth 
opportunities tend to have lower leverage (Goyal et al., 2002). Asset tangibility is another 
important determinant of capital structure. Firms with liquid assets are more likely to 
borrow against their assets and have lower bankruptcy costs, resulting in higher debt 
ratios (Titman and Wessels, 1988). We use the ratio of tangible assets to the book value 
of total assets to account for asset tangibility (Tangible Assets/TA). To control for firm 
profitability, we use earnings before taxes, preferred dividends, and interest payments 
over total assets variables (EBITDA/TA). Following Lemmon et al. (2008), we further 
include median book leverage for each three-digit SIC industry grouping to account for 
systematic industry differences in leverage across industries (Median Industry Leverage). 
 After accounting for macroeconomic conditions and traditional determinants of 
capital structure, we find that leverage decreases when economic policy uncertainty 
increases. The effect is both statistically and economically significant. Specifically, an 
increase of one standard deviation in EPU decreases Book Leverage by 0.5 percentage 
points in Model 1, which corresponds to a decrease of 2% relative to average Book 
Leverage in our sample. The results remain intact when we include industry fixed effects 
(Model 2) and firm fixed effects (Model 3). Collectively, these findings suggest that firms 
account for economic policy uncertainty in capital structure decisions. These results are 
also consistent with both the supply and demand-based mechanisms of capital structure. 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables are largely consistent with 
previous studies (e.g., Hovakimian et al., 2001, Flannery and Rangan, 2006, Lemmon et 
al., 2008, Frank and Goyal, 2009). For example, our estimates reveal that Firm Size is 
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positively associated with Book Leverage, suggesting that larger firms on average have 
higher debt ratios. Tangible Asset/TA also has a positive effect on leverage. This finding 
is consistent with the idea that firms with more tangible assets are better able to borrow 
against their assets. Median Industry Leverage has a positive effect on leverage, while the 
coefficient estimate for the dividend payer is positive. Both profitability (EBITDA/TA) 
and growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio) are negatively associated with debt 
ratios.  
Next, we employ a battery of tests to disentangle supply and demand-based 
mechanisms of capital structure. Specifically, we examine whether factors that are found 
to be associated with the supply channel of capital structure moderate the effect of 
economic policy uncertainty on capital structure choices. Faulkender and Peterson (2006) 
point out that having access to public debt markets partially eliminates frictions in the 
supply of capital (e.g., credit rationing in the private debt market) by showing that rated 
firms have higher leverage relative to unrated firms. Thus, we expect unrated firms to 
have a different response to heightened EPU if economic policy uncertainty affects firms’ 
capital structure decisions through the credit supply channel. Specifically, they should 
have more difficulty in borrowing; thereby reducing their debt ratios more than rated 
firms in periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Along the same line, if economic 
policy uncertainty creates a shift in credit supply towards relatively safe debt securities, 
below-investment-grade firms are also more likely to be shut out of debt markets and 
have lower debt ratios compared to firms with investment grade ratings during periods of 
high economic policy uncertainty. 
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We test these hypotheses in Table 2.4 by including the interaction term of the 
Rating variable, which takes the value of one if the firm has a rating, and EPU in leverage 
regressions. Model 1 reports a positive coefficient estimate for the interaction term of 
Rating and EPU. However, the estimate lacks statistical significance. To further 
disentangle the effects of supply- and demand-based theories of capital structure, we 
focus on a subsample of rated firms and estimate the effect of the interaction term of 
Investment Grade Rating, which takes the value of one if the firm has an investment grade 
rating, and EPU on Book Leverage. We continue to find a positive and significant 
interaction term in Model 2, indicating that below-investment-grade firms lower their 
debt ratios more than their investment grade counterparts when EPU increases. These 
findings reveal that firms that are exposed to more frictions in accessing capital exhibit 
higher sensitivity to economic policy uncertainty in adjusting capital structures. 
Collectively, these results are consistent with the supply-based mechanism of capital 
structure, but are difficult to reconcile with the demand-based theories of capital structure. 
Additionally, we examine whether economic policy uncertainty has any impact 
on the lengths of firms’ dormant periods between two consecutive debt-financing spikes 
and how these impacts vary with the source of finance. Table 2.5 presents the duration 
models for debt issuance decisions in which the dependent variable is the time between 
two consecutive debt issuances. Based on previous literature (Hovakimian, Opler, and 
Titman, 2001; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Leary and Roberts, 2005), we identify a debt 
issuance as having occurred in a given quarter if the net change in debt, normalized by 
the book value of assets at the end of previous period, is greater than 5 percent. The time 
between the two consecutive debt issuance dates is the dormant period in our analysis. 
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The duration models of Table 2.5 present novel evidence suggesting significant 
adverse effects of economic policy uncertainty on debt issuance decisions. Estimates of 
Model 1 indicate that a one standard deviation (0.3) increase in EPU is associated with a 
decrease in the probability of issuing debt in the next quarter by 10% (p<0.01). That is, 
firms wait longer to issue debt when EPU elevates. We also find that having access to 
public debt markets moderates the relationship between EPU and duration periods. 
Estimates of Model 2 show that the hazard impact of economic policy uncertainty on 
nonrated firms is -34.7% (p<0.01), yet that on rated firms decreases significantly by only 
11% (p<0.01). We further examine the differential hazard impacts of investment and non-
investment grade firms in a subsample of rated firms. Model 3 reports that the hazard 
impact of economic policy uncertainty on noninvestment grade firms is -32.1% (p<0.01), 
while that on investment grade firms decreases by 7.5% (p<0.01). Collectively, the 
moderating effects of having access to public debt markets in general and having an 
investment grade rating in particular reinforce the supply-based mechanisms of capital 
structure. However, these findings are difficult to reconcile with the demand-based 
theories of capital structure.  
In addition, estimates of the hazard impacts of other control variables are largely 
consistent with those from previous literature (Leary and Roberts, 2005). Firms that are 
more profitable and have higher tangible assets ratio wait longer to issue debt. 
Furthermore, firms with more growth opportunities have longer dormant periods. 
Next, we examine whether economic policy uncertainty influences firms’ debt 
maturity structures. Banks use price and non-price terms as complements in contracting, 
and debt maturity is an important non-price contract term (Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe, 
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2000). Following prior literature (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995), we measure Debt 
Maturity as the ratio of long-term debt over total debt. In Table 2.6, we report regression 
estimates for the effect of economic policy uncertainty on Debt Maturity. The coefficient 
of the EPU index in Model 1 is negative and significant (p<0.10), suggesting that the ratio 
of long-term debt decreases when EPU increases. However, the effect is asymmetric for 
firms with and without access to public debt markets. Specifically, a positive and 
significant coefficient estimate of the interaction term of EPU and Rated in Model 2 
indicates that the long-term debt ratio of unrated firms decreases more than rated firms 
when EPU increases. In a subsample of rated firms, Model 3 reports a positive and 
significant effect of the interaction term of Investment Grade and EPU, suggesting that 
firms with investment grade ratings are less affected by economic policy uncertainty in 
determining debt maturity structure. Collectively, these results demonstrate that firms 
with limited access to supply of debt have difficulty issuing long-term debt in periods of 
high economic policy uncertainty. These findings lend further support to the supply-based 




Endogeneity concerns may arise if one believes that economic policy uncertainty 
and capital structure adjustments are either determined simultaneously or are both 
determined by unobserved factors. The standard approach to address such concerns is to 
implement instrumental variable (IV) analysis, in which the selected IV should correlate 
with economic policy uncertainty but not with capital structure adjustments. Inspired by 
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political science literature, we construct such an IV that measures the level of political 
polarization in the United States Senate. Conceptually, per McCarty (2012), a higher level 
of partisan polarization can “make it harder to build legislative coalitions, leading to 
policy gridlock,” and consequently “produce greater variation in policy.” In contrast, 
there is no correlation between the level of political polarization and firms’ capital 
structure decisions. Collectively, these findings validate the political polarization measure 
as an instrument for our IV analysis.16  
We empirically measure Political Polarization using the DW-NOMINATE scores 
of McCarty et al. (1997). Per Poole and Rosenthal (2000), these scores are designed to 
track legislators’ ideological positions over time and have several dimensions.17 Here, we 
focus on the first dimension that reflects legislators’ position on government intervention 
in the economy and is closely related to economic policy uncertainty. Specifically, 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Gulen and Ion, 2016), we construct our measure as the 
average of these scores for the Republican Party members in the Senate minus that for 
the Democratic Party members in the Senate. 
 Table 2.7 reports the IV analysis results using the Political Polarization measure 
as an instrument for economic policy uncertainty. We estimate the coefficients by 
implementing a two stage least square (2SLS) model where the dependent variables are 
EPU and book leverage in the first and second stages, respectively. The focus of this 
subsection is the second stage regression, while we report the first stage estimates in 
Appendix. Model 1 presents coefficient estimates for control variables and year fixed 
effects of the second stage regression. After accounting for macroeconomic factors and 
                                                 
16 In Appendix B, we provide the estimates for the first stage IV regression. 
17 See McCarty (2011) for a detailed description of the scores.  
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firm characteristics, we find a negative and significant effect of economic policy 
uncertainty on leverage. The results remain intact even after including industry fixed 
effects in Model 2. These findings partially ameliorate the concern that economic policy 
uncertainty is endogenous while strengthening our conjecture that economic policy 
uncertainty plays a distinct role in capital structure adjustments. 
We further address potential endogeneity concerns by exploiting the cross-
sectional differences in firms’ sensitivity to economic policy. Goldman et al. (2009) argue 
that firms in defense and energy industries are more sensitive to government economic 
policies relative to firms in other industries as these firms are frequent government 
contractors and heavily regulated, respectively. Thus, uncertainty associated with 
government economic policies are more likely to affect capital structures of the firms in 
defense and energy industries if uncertainty plays any role in capital structure decisions. 
However, if there is an omitted variable that drives both economic policy uncertainty and 
capital structure adjustments, the effects of economic policy uncertainty on capital 
structure adjustments are less likely to depend on firms’ sensitivity to economic policy.  
Subsequently, we examine whether sensitivities to economic policy amplifies the 
effect of EPU on capital structure decisions. Table 2.8 shows the impacts of economic 
policy uncertainty on debt ratios and debt issuances. Panel A presents OLS estimation 
results where the dependent variable is Book Leverage. We estimate three model 
specifications; Model 1 includes control variables and year fixed effects, while we add 
industry fixed effects in Model 2. Finally, we replace industry fixed effects with firm 
fixed effects in Model 3. We find negative and significant coefficient estimates for the 
interaction term of EPU and Policy Sensitivity in all three Models, suggesting that the 
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effect of economic policy uncertainty is stronger for firms that are identified to be more 
sensitive to economic policy uncertainty. Panel B reports the hazard impacts on firms’ 
debt issuance decisions, where the dependent variable is the spell between two financing 
spikes. The negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term between the EPU 
and Policy Sensitivity indicates that firms that are more sensitive to economic policy 
uncertainty wait longer to issue debt when economic policy uncertainty heightens. 
Collectively, these amplified responses of politically sensitive firms to increased EPU is 
difficult to reconcile with the omitted variable explanation while providing further 
evidence for the distinct role of EPU in capital structure decisions.  
 
V. Corporate investments and capital structure decisions 
In this subsection, we examine whether the previously documented effect of EPU 
on capital structure is principally driven by changes in corporate investments. Previous 
studies have shown a negative relationship between corporate investment and economic 
policy uncertainty (Baker et al., 2013; Gulen and Ion, 2016). Thus, an increase in 
economic policy uncertainty may decrease corporate investments and such reduction in 
investments may lead to a decrease in firms’ demands for debt financing, potentially 
manifesting itself as lower corporate debt ratios. 
To address this concern, we begin by examining whether economic policy 
uncertainty has a direct effect on corporate borrowing costs. We assess this effect by 
employing credit spreads at both the aggregate and the firm levels. At the aggregate level, 
we estimate the relation between economic policy uncertainty and the Average Yield 
Spread, the yield difference between Baa-rated corporate bonds and Aaa-rated corporate 
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bonds. At the firm level, we employ a regression framework like Campbell and Taksler 
(2003), where we estimate the relation between economic policy uncertainty and Bond 
Issuance Spread, the yield difference between a newly issued corporate bond and a 
matched Treasury bond. 
Panel A of Table 2.9 reports the estimates of a time series regression of average 
yield spread on the EPU index and other controls. There is a positive and significant 
relation between economic policy uncertainty and cost of debt at the aggregate level. 
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the EPU index leads to a 9 basis points 
increase in Credit Spread (p<0.01). We continue to find significant and positive effects 
of the EPU index on the yield spread at the firm level when we run a regression of the 
issuance yield spread on the EPU index and other control variables in Panel B. A one 
standard deviation increase in the EPU index leads to an increase in the Average Offering 
Yield by 100 basis points (p<0.01). These findings support our conjecture that economic 
policy uncertainty increases borrowing costs and exerts a direct impact on financing 
activities through the supply of capital channel. Coupled with the shortened debt maturity 
reported in Table 2.6, increasing yields during periods of high economic policy 
uncertainty indicate a contraction of funds, lending further support to the supply-based 
mechanism of capital structure.  
We also estimate a simultaneous regression system involving Book Leverage, 
Investment, and EPU in Table 2.10. In the first regression of the system, we regress Book 
Leverage on contemporaneous Investment and EPU as well as other determinants of Book 
Leverage that are included in Table 2.3. The dependent variables are Investment and EPU 
in the second and third regressions, respectively. Model 1 reports negative and significant 
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effect of EPU on Book Leverage even after accounting for Investment and other 
determinants of capital structure. We also find a negative and significant effect of EPU 
on Investment. These findings support the view that EPU has a first order effect on capital 
structure choices.  
Finally, we study whether firms change their capital structures in response to 
changes to economic policy uncertainty, even in periods when they do not change their 
investments substantially. We construct a subsample by selecting firm-quarter 
observations in which the change in Investment from its value in the previous quarter is 
less than 1%. This sub-sample analysis allows us to obtain an estimate of the effect of 
economic policy uncertainty on capital structure, while isolating the effect of a time-
varying corporate investment on debt ratios. Table 2.11 reports negative and significant 
coefficient estimates of EPU in this sub-sample. These findings indicate that firms lower 
their debt ratios in periods of high economic policy uncertainty even in the absence of a 
change in investments. Collectively, these results lend further support to the view that 
EPU has a first order effect on capital structure choices.  
 
VI. Dynamics of capital structure adjustments in times of high economic policy 
uncertainty 
In this subsection, we examine whether highly leveraged firms are more sensitive 
to changes in economic policy uncertainty compared to low leverage firms by utilizing 
quintile regressions. Unlike OLS regressions, which estimate the effects of changes in 
independent variables on the conditional mean of the dependent variable, quantile 
regressions estimate thoes effects on conditional quantiles, such as median or quartiles, 
52 
of the distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker, 2005). Specifically, we estimate 
the effect of economic policy uncertainty on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles 
of Book Leverage. Therefore, by comparing the coefficient estimates for the EPU index 
in the regressions for all five percentiles, we can draw inferences on whether differences 
in levels of debt generate variations in response to increased economic policy uncertainty.   
Table 2.12 reports the coefficient estimates of the quantile regressions. In Model 
1, where the dependent variable is the conditional 10th percentile of Book Leverage, the 
coefficient of the EPU index is negative but lacks significance. However, the EPU index 
has a negative and significant effect on Book Leverage in all other models. Furthermore, 
the absolute values of the coefficient estimates for EPU almost double if we move from 
the 25th percentile (Model 2) to 75th percentile (Model 4). Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in the EPU index is associated with nearly a 20 basis points decrease 
in the 25th percentile of the leverage distribution, while it generates a decrease of 40 basis 
points for the firms in the 75th percentile. These estimates further reveal that highly 
leveraged firms reduce their debt ratios more than firms with relatively low debt ratios. 
Motivated by the above finding that the adverse effect of economic policy 
uncertainty on leverage is stronger for highly leveraged firms, we further study the 
variation in leverage changes in response to EPU by employing duration analysis in the 
spirit of Leary and Roberts (2005). Duration analysis allows us to estimate the effects of 
economic policy uncertainty on the lengths of the time periods for which firms are highly 
leveraged, while controlling for traditional determinants of capital structure. Table 2.13 
shows the results from our duration analysis for four leverage regime spells: lowest 
quartile, mid-low quartile, mid-high quartile, and highest quartile. The dependent variable 
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is the time during which a firm stays in a certain leverage regime (e.g., the lowest 
quartile). This empirical approach allows us to assess the effect of policy uncertainty on 
capital structure adjustment more accurately, given these adjustments are infrequent and 
discontinuous (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007).   
We find significant and asymmetric effects of EPU on capital structure 
adjustments. For the lowest leverage spell (quartile 1), a one-standard deviation (0.3) 
increase in EPU corresponds to a 1.5% decrease (-0.3×5.1) in the probability of firms 
ending their underleverage spells in the subsequent quarter (p-value<0.01). In sharp 
contrast, for the highest leverage spell (quartile 4), a one standard deviation increase in 
EPU is associated with a 1.8% increase in the probability of firms ending their 
overleverage spells in the next quarter. These findings indicate that firms are more likely 
to leave the highest leverage quartile, but are more likely to stay in the lowest quartile 
during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Thus, these results are consistent 
with previously documented results from quantile regressions, suggesting that the effects 
of economic policy uncertainty on capital structure mostly come from highly leveraged 
firms.   
Effects of other explanatory variables on capital structure in our analysis are 
largely consistent with previous studies (Leary and Roberts, 2005). For example, firms 
are more likely to increase leverage when they are larger and have a higher Tangible 
Assets/TA ratio. Firms in highly leveraged industries are also more likely to increase 
leverage in the subsequent quarter. Finally, firms with high Market-to-Book ratios 
maintain low debt ratios.  
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We further use alternative measures of economic policy uncertainty to establish 
robustness for our main conclusions. Since the EPU Index is a summary of three 
components: divergence of media coverage, tax expiration codes, and economic forecast 
disagreements, we utilize its three individual components to further examine the nature 
of the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and capital structure. We present 
our regression estimates in Table 2.14 in which the dependent variable is Book Leverage. 
All components have negative estimates in leverage regressions while the effect is the 
strongest for the news-based component. This finding can be interpreted in part by the 
construction of the news index, which is designed to capture the uncertainty associated 
with all policy decisions, including those captured by the tax-based component and by 
the inflation component.18   
We also use an alternative measure of leverage to establish robustness for our 
main conclusions, which are based on Book Leverage. In Table 2.15, we replicate the 
panel regression presented in Table 2.3 with Market Leverage as the dependent variable. 
The coefficient estimates of the EPU index in Table 2.17 are negative and significant in 
all three models, which are consistent with the estimates in Table 2.3. Furthermore, the 
magnitudes of the estimates in Table 2.17 are larger than those in Table 2.3. For example, 
the coefficient of the EPU index is -0.036 in Model 1 of Table 2.17 although it is -0.014 
in Model 1 of Table 2.3. Similar relations hold in other models as well. These results 
reinforce our conclusion that firms have lower leverage when economic policy 
uncertainty elevates. They also demonstrate that our main conclusions are not sensitive 
to the choice of the measure of leverage. 
                                                 
18 Gulen and Ion (2016) also find the majority of the effect of the overall index on investments comes from 
the news component. 
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Lastly, we examine how economic policy uncertainty affects firms’ target 
adjusted debt ratios. We estimate a set of dynamic capital structure models that allow 
firms to move toward their target debt ratios over time (e.g., Fama and French, 2002; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008). Table 2.16 presents coefficient 
estimates of the dynamics models including firm fixed effects. Specifically, Model 1 of 
Panel A in Table 2.18 reports that a one standard deviation increase in EPU reduces the 
Target Adjusted Book Leverage by 9 basis points (p<0.01). Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
and Flannery and Hankins (2013) argue that the fixed effect estimator is subject to 
endogeneity concerns in the dynamic panels. Thus, we follow Flannery and Hankins 
(2013) and use the estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) in Model 2. The result remains 
intact. The evidence from these models suggests that an increase in economic policy 
uncertainty reduces a firm’s leverage even after accounting for the firm’s target capital 
structure.     
We also estimate the market leverage adjustments in Panel B of Table 2.16. There 
are significant and negative effects of EPU on market leverage adjustments in all models. 
A one standard deviation increase in EPU lowers Market Leverage by 100 basis points 
in Model 4. In sum, the findings in Table 2.16 are consistent with the results in previous 
tables that leverage is negatively associated with EPU. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
In this study, we analyze the effect of policy-related uncertainty on the capital 
structure adjustments of U.S. public corporations. By the employing economic policy 
uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013), we find a significant effect of economic policy 
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uncertainty on capital structure choices after accounting for the effects of economic 
conditions, firm and industry characteristics. Specifically, firms delay issuing debt and 
reduce leverage, corporate debt maturity shortens and borrowing costs increase when 
economic policy uncertainty increases. We also find that the effects of economic policy 
uncertainty on capital structure choices are moderated by the supply-side factors 
including access to debt markets and having an investment grade debt rating. 
Collectively, the evidence suggests that supply of capital plays an important role in times 
of high economic policy uncertainty in corporate capital structure choices. 
The paper also contributes to the growing literature that examines the impact of 
government policy uncertainty on the corporate policies by identifying a new channel; 
corporate capital structure adjustments. Furthermore, our findings add to the discussion 
on the supply and the demand mechanisms of capital structure. We also demonstrate that 
the uncertainty generated by policy-makers influence corporate capital structure 
adjustments distinctively from other macroeconomic factors. Thus, policy-makers should 
not only worry of making the right decisions, but should also be aware of the uncertainty 
generated by prolonged discussions on economic policies. Lastly, our paper generates 
new insights regarding leverage stabilities: leverage stability depends on the level of 








Access to Finance, Bureaucracy, and Capital Allocation Efficiency: 
Evidence from International Data19 
 
I. Introduction 
The efficiency of capital allocation is far from ideal in most countries (e.g., King 
and Levine, 1993; Hall and Jones, 1999; Wurgler, 2000; Levine, 2005), and inefficient 
capital allocation (hereinafter: misallocation) has profound implications. For example, 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that if capital in China and India was allocated as 
efficiently as it is in the U.S., the total factor productivity of manufacturers could increase 
by up to 50% and 60%, respectively.20 Despite the significance of misallocation, only 
scant empirical evidence exists related to quantifying its degree and identifying its 
determinants. The empirical evidence is even scarcer for developing countries, where 
misallocation is more pronounced. The present paper fills this void by focusing on a wide 
spectrum of developing countries and examining three questions: First, what is the extent 
of misallocation in these countries? Second, what are the underlying sources of 
misallocation? Third, how quantitatively significant are the influences of these 
determinants on capital misallocation? 
I measure the degree of misallocation using the dispersion of the marginal product 
of capital across firms. This is based on the idea that the marginal product of capital 
should be identical in all firms when capital is perfectly allocated (e.g., Melitz, 2003). As 
                                                 
19 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Scott Guernsey and Scott Linn. 
20 Other important studies include Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2008); Banerjee and Duflo (2004); 
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013); and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). 
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such, any observed deviations in the marginal product of capital across firms from their 
benchmark should be a result of distortions in the economy. 
  To derive a testable empirical model, I utilize the analytical framework considered 
by Melitz (2003), Dollar and Wei (2007), and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to study the 
relations between misallocation and various sources of distortions in a competitive 
equilibrium. Within this framework, firms—as production units—face heterogeneous 
distortions in their input markets, their capital and labor markets, and their output 
markets. Distortions in the markets for capital primarily result from financial frictions, 
such as access to finance and information asymmetry. Distortions in the output markets 
largely result from bureaucratic frictions, such as red tape and bribery. In the equilibrium, 
firms equate their marginal products of capital with their user costs of capital (e.g., the 
financing costs). Firms facing higher distortions must therefore have higher returns to 
capital. Moreover, the degree of misallocation increases in the heterogeneity of the 
distortions they confront.  
To cover a wide spectrum of developing countries in which financial constraints 
and bureaucratic frictions are more prominent, I use the latest harmonized establishment-
level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey. My sample includes 59 countries, 
most of which are low- or middle-income countries that are rarely covered in the finance 
literature before. A main advantage of this data is that it provides direct information on 
access to finance (e.g., bank accounts, credit lines, and the percentage of assets financed 
by financial institutions); in contrast, other studies largely rely on imperfect proxies or 
indirect modeling.21 Another advantage is that this data contains information on firms’ 
                                                 
21 See for example Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Whited and Wu (2006), Almeida and Campello (2007), 
and Hadlock and Pierce (2010). 
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burdens of bureaucracy, such as the time they spend on government and the percentage 
of revenue they pay informally to government officials. In addition, this dataset covers 
not only public-listed firms but also private firms, especially small companies that have 
fewer than 20 employees.   
I find that capital misallocation, as measured by the dispersions of the marginal 
revenue product of capital (MRPK) across firms, is pervasive in developing countries. I 
calculate the MPRK for each company using firm-level output and capital stocks under 
the assumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. I find that the country-level 
standard deviation of MRPK ranges from 1.83 to 9.38, which indicates significant 
misallocation—a fact that is not revealed in publicly available aggregate country figures.  
Having calculated the extent of misallocation, I proceed to examining the difference in 
return to capital at the firm level within countries and how misallocation varies across 
countries. In my multivariate regression analyses, I find evidence that financial 
constraints, bureaucratic frictions, information asymmetry, and gender inequality 
significantly help to impede the most efficient allocation of capital across firms. I further 
show that these factors exert greater influences on already highly distorted firms (i.e., 
those that need capital). In my industry-level analyses, I discover that the dispersion in 
the return to capital is positively related to the heterogeneities in firms’ access to finance 
and the bureaucratic frictions that they face. These results indicate that eliminating 
financial frictions, excessive business regulations, and gender inequality can mitigate 
misallocation and should become first-order policy concerns for the governments of 
developing countries.  
60 
This paper relates to the literature that documents the extent and determinants of 
capital allocation. Wurgler (2000) studies a country-level sample and finds that a well-
developed financial market increases the investment efficiency within a nation. 
Moreover, he identifies that investment efficiency decreases in relation to the percentage 
of state ownership in the economy and increases in relation to the amount of firm-specific 
information and investor protection. At the firm level, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) 
extend the neoclassical model to show how plant-level idiosyncratic distortions that result 
from government policies can lead to misallocation. Finally, Collard-Wexler, Asker, and 
De Loecker (2011) demonstrate that volatility in total factor productivity is a significant 
determinant of misallocation across countries.  
A firm’s access to finance is one of the most studied misallocation-generating 
factors. For example, several researchers have developed quantitative frameworks to 
show that financial frictions have a significant impact on capital allocation, including 
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2012); Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011); and Moll 
(2014). On the empirical side, many investigators provide evidence that financial 
development is a key promoter in the capital allocation process, such as King and Levine 
(1993); Wurgler (2000); Banerjee and Moll (2010); Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2013); 
and Midrigan and Xu (2014).   
In addition to financial market imperfection, researchers claim that political 
factors such as excessive regulation, rampant corruption, and weak property rights 
protection are also responsible for preventing resources from being optimally allocated 
within a country (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). In their model, 
Restuccia and Rogerson (2007) specify that misallocation originates from policy-induced 
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distortions. Moreover, in studying a sample of 10 African countries Kalemli-Ozcan and 
Sorensen (2012) find that the strength of property rights and the quality of the legal 
system are negatively related to country-level returns to capital. Another way to 
incorporate political factors is to examine whether systematic differences in returns to 
capital exist among state- and non-state-owned firms. In studies of Chinese companies, 
Dollar and Wei (2007) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find evidence that state-owned 
firms have lower returns to capital than domestic and foreign-owned firms.   
My work extends the existing literature in several ways. First, this study focuses 
on firms in low- and middle-income countries. These firms are particularly interesting to 
investigate given that they are most likely to face high distortions in their economies and 
thus exhibit more severe capital misallocation than firms in developed countries. To the 
best of my knowledge, no study has systematically calculated the extent of misallocation 
and its determinants for a large set of low- and middle-income countries using comparable 
firm-level data; many of the countries in my sample are examined for the first time. 
Moreover, the harmonized nature of the dataset allows for a direct comparison of the 
extent of capital misallocation across countries and industries. 
Next, this paper is the first to empirically study the role of an owner’s gender in 
the allocation of capital. Gender inequality in education and employment opportunities is 
prevalent in many developing countries (Dollar and Gatti, 1999) and such inequality may 
reduce growth and development (Klasen, 1999). I provide evidence that firms with at 
least one female owner face higher distortion in capital and output markets than other 
companies.  
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Finally, this study provides new evidence concerning how much difference in the 
cost of capital the examined sources of distortion translate to. While establishing the 
various origins of capital allocative inefficiency in developing countries, I acknowledge 
that these determinants do not all contribute to the degree of misallocation in the same 
way. This observation is particularly important to policymakers, as they want to know the 
most effective methods for eliminating distortion in the economy.  
 
II. Data 
To assess the firm-specific marginal product of capital, the degree of 
misallocation, and the determinants of firm-specific, industry-level, and country-level 
resource allocative efficiency, I utilize an Enterprise Survey dataset (as available on the 
World Bank’s website). The Enterprise Survey is a harmonized, stratified, randomly 
sampled establishment-level database compiled from research undertaken by the World 
Bank in developing countries (as well as in a few developed countries). The survey is 
conducted through face-to-face interviews with firms’ business administrators and 
owners. Most importantly, the survey’s questionnaires are administered within a 
framework of common guidelines developed in the design and implementation. The aim 
of the survey is to provide consistent, in-depth evaluations of the various constraints faced 
by firms around the world and information about how those constraints affect firm 
performance and economic growth. The dataset thus includes both quantitative and 
qualitative as well as objective and subjective information concerning various aspects of 
the business climate faced by firms, including the quality of infrastructure, law 
enforcement and corruption, red tape, and access to finance. The dataset also provides 
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detailed documentation related to firm characteristics and performance, such as annual 
sales, investment, input costs, export activity, firm age, and employment.   
Two major core surveys consistently measured firm information across countries: 
one was conducted from 2002 to 2005, the other from 2006 to 2016. While most existing 
research on the Enterprise Survey dataset made use of the earlier survey, my empirical 
work relies on the latter one given that it is more up to date and relatively less explored. 
The original data contains 225 country surveys and covers more than 120,000 firms. 
However, the sample size drops substantially after I apply my data cleaning criteria. 
Specifically, I exclude firms with negative, zero, or missing values in relation to key 
variables (including sales, the replacement cost of capital, the number of permanent 
employees, the number of full-time temporary workers, raw materials and intermediate 
goods, and the total cost of labor). I also omit firms with negative value-added sales and 
any country-year for which the sample contains fewer than 100 firms.  
My final dataset includes information on 27,634 firms across 59 countries. Table 
1 reports a complete list of all countries, the corresponding survey years, and the number 
of firms in each country-year. For 18 countries, more than one round of the survey is 
available. In terms of geographical coverage, 31% of my sample countries are in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), 22% are in Sub-Sahara Africa (AFR), 15% are in 
South Asia (SAR), 13% are in East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), 9% are in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa (MNA), and 8% are in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Figure 3.1 
presents the visual display of the distribution of firms across these regions. The unit of 
observation is establishments. The sample of establishments in each country is also 
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stratified by size, sector, and location, which results in the sample being generally 
representative of the whole economy.   
The strength of the dataset is its rich coverage of low- and middle-income 
countries. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of firms across four income groups based on 
the World Bank’s income classification scheme. My dataset includes 19 low-income 
countries, 19 low-middle-income countries, 19 upper-middle-income countries, and 2 
high-income countries. To the best of my knowledge, no systematic study calculates the 
extent of misallocation and its determinants for a large set of low- and middle-income 
countries using comparable firm-level data. These countries are particularly interesting 
to investigate, given that they are most likely to face high distortion in their economies. 
Compared to developed nations, low- and middle-income countries are often 
characterized by insufficient property rights protection, weak law and order, rampant 
corruption, and a weak formal financial market; these disadvantages could lead to a large 
distortion in resource allocation. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Dollar and 
Wei (2007) document that state-owned firms have a lower MRPK than domestic private 
firms. A review of the literature reveals that many of the countries in my sample are being 
investigated based on the extent of capital allocative inefficiency for the first time.   
Another salient feature of the dataset is that it not only covers large or listed firms, 
but also includes many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of firm size in my sample. Small firms are defined as 
having a maximum of 20 employees; medium firms are defined as having more than 20 
but fewer than 100 employees; and large firms are defined as having a minimum of 100 
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employees. My sample includes 11,170 (40%) small firms, 10,461 (38%) medium firms, 
and 6,003 (22%) large firms. 
 
III. The extent of capital misallocation 
 To study the extent of capital misallocation in my sample of countries, I first 
calculate firm-specific MRPK (based on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and competitive markets). The MRPK for firm i in industry s in a country-year 
is defined as: 




where 𝑃𝑖𝑌𝑖 represents a firm’s value-added sale, 𝐾𝑖 is measured by a firm’s replacement 
cost of capital, and 𝛼 represents capital’s share of income. By allowing capital’s share of 
income to be industry-country or firm specific, I have two corresponding measures of 
MRPK. For the first one, I calculate the country-level standard deviation of the logarithm 
of MRPK; if capitals were efficiently allocated, it should be close to zero. For the second 
one, I study the wedges in MRPK within a country. The wedge for firm i in industry s is 
defined as follows: 
(3.2)  𝑊𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠 =
𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑖𝑠
𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
where 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  represents the industry median level of MRPK. I exclude industries with 
fewer than six firms. If a company is close to the optimal allocation of capital, its wedge 
should take the value close to unity. Firms with wedges above unity reflect a lack of 
capital, whereas firms with wedges below unity reflect having too much capital.  
In Table 3.1, I report the summary of MRPK by country. The first three columns 
present the years, the countries, and the number of firms in each country for each year. 
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The next three columns contain the standard deviation, the median, and the mean wedge 
of MRPK for all the firms in each country for each year. Finally, the last three columns 
report the percentages of small, mid-sized, and large firms, where small firms are those 
that have no more than 20 employees and large firms are those that have more than 100 
employees.    
 The standard deviation of MRPK is very high in most of the countries considered. 
Moreover, the average wedge of MRPK is above unity in most countries, which indicates 
that capital misallocation is still common even within narrowly defined industries. In my 
sample, 18 countries have two rounds of surveys available; moreover, for 13 of them the 
two rounds cover the time span before and after the 2008 global financial crisis.22 I use 
this opportunity to study the revolution of capital misallocations before and after the crisis 
in these countries. Based on the percentage change in the level of country average wedge, 
I find that among these 13 countries, only 5 have lower distortion after the crisis than 
before and  8 countries experience a significant increase in capital misallocation. These 
findings provide suggestive evidence that financial crisis tends to increase the 
misallocation of capital, which is in contrast to the creative destruction view that financial 
crisis helps reduce distortion. 
In Table 3.2, I summarize MRPK by industry. My industry classification, which 
is consistent with Saliola and Seker (2011), entails using a firm’s main product to 
determine its two-digit industry code within the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC). My sample reflects nine industries, most of which are linked to 
manufacturing production (although a small number of firms are in the service sector). 
                                                 
22 Indonesia, Philippines, Russia, Turkey, and Vietnam are among the countries for which the two rounds 
of the survey are both conducted during or after the financial crisis. 
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Sizable variations of MRPK within an industry can be observed across both time and 
industries.  
 
IV. Identifying sources of misallocation: Firm-level evidence 
 First, I describe the linkage between the firm-level observed return to capital and 
distortions in capital and output. To do so I use a theoretical framework proposed by 
Dollar and Wei (2007) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) that provides the econometric 
specifications necessary for the subsequent empirical analysis.    
Consider a representative firm that faces competitive output and input markets. 
The goal of a representative firm i in industry s in a country is to maximize its profit. Let 
𝜋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖, 𝐾𝑖, and 𝐿𝑖  represent firm i’s profit, output, capital, and labor respectively. Firm i’s 
problem is thus 
(3.3)    𝑀𝑎𝑥 π𝑠𝑖  = 𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑌𝑠𝑖 – 𝑟𝑠𝑖𝐾𝑠𝑖 – 𝑤𝑠𝑖𝐿𝑠𝑖                                  
where 𝑝𝑠𝑖 ,  𝑟𝑠𝑖, and 𝑤𝑠𝑖 respectively represent firm-specific output price, the rental cost of 
capital, and wage rate.  
Seeing as I focus on the distortions that a firm can face in the economy, following 
Dollar and Wei (2007) I consider three types of distortion: output (𝜏𝑌), labor (𝜏𝐿), and 
capital (𝜏𝐾). These distortions are reflected in the prices; that is, they make a firm’s actual 
output price and input costs deviate from the market prices. For simplicity, I omit the 
country and year subscripts. Thus, 
(3.4)    𝑝𝑠𝑖 = 𝑝𝑠(1 − 𝜏𝑌
𝑠𝑖)                                                      
(3.5)     𝑟𝑠𝑖 = 𝑟𝑠(1 + 𝜏𝐾
𝑠𝑖)                                                         
(3.6)    𝑤𝑗 = 𝑤𝑠(1 + 𝜏𝐿
𝑠𝑖)                                                                                   
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where 𝑝𝑠, 𝑟𝑠, and 𝑤𝑠 respectively represent the output price, rental cost of capital, and 
wage rate shared by all firms in the absence of distortion within a sector in a country in a 
year. The output distortion 𝜏𝑌
𝑖
 originates from nonmarket behaviors that influence product 
prices and tend to affect both a company’s capital and labor choices. For example, a tax 
on a firm’s revenue reflects itself as a positive distortion, whereas a favorable subsidy for 
a firm’s product shows itself as a negative distortion. Moreover, the output distortions 
faced by firms in developing countries are often high transportation costs, generally poor 
electricity and water supplies, and bribes paid to government officials. In turn, capital 
distortion (𝜏𝐾) documents all of the factors that affect the cost of capital. For example, if 
a firm has better access to credit or can enjoy a favorable interest rate on its investment, 
then 𝜏𝐾  would be negative; on the other hand, if it faces severe constraints on borrowing 
or a high interest rate charge, 𝜏𝐾 will be positive. Similarly, 𝜏𝐿 shows all distortions in 
the cost of labor. For example, if a firm faces excessive labor regulations, then 𝜏𝐿would 
be positive. 
On the production side, the firm-level production function is assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas. Moreover, capital and labor’s share of income is held constant within an 
industry. As such, firm-level TFP 𝐴𝑠𝑖 captures all differences across firms in the same 
sector within the same country in a year. 
(3.7)    𝑌𝑠𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐾𝑖, 𝐿𝑖) = 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝐾𝑠𝑖
𝛼𝐿𝑠𝑖
1−𝛼                                              
where α is the capital elasticity and 1-α is the labor elasticity. 
The first-order condition of the firm-maximizing profit implies that a firm will 
equate its MRPK to the firm-specific interest rate (i.e., the rental cost of capital). 
(3.8)    𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑖 = 𝑝𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑓
′(𝐾𝑖, 𝐿𝑖) = 𝑟𝑠𝑖                                         
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The Cobb-Douglas production function leads to a neat relation between the average 
revenue product of capital (ARPK) and MRPK:   
(3.9)    𝐴𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑖 = (
1
𝛼𝑠
) 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑖                                                     
As Dollar and Wei (2007) argue, the problem faced by econometricians is that not all 
firm-specific distortions are readily observable—which prevents researchers from 
obtaining the true measure of ARPK directly. In fact, the observed ARPK is expressed as 




                                                                          
Connecting the previous equations leads to 













                                  
Similarly, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) document the expression of MRPKo as proportional 
to the above ARPK expression. 





                                                                    
Intuitively, equation (3.12) shows that keeping everything else constant, the higher 
𝜏𝑘
𝑠𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝑌
𝑠𝑖  are, the higher the observed ARPK is. To continue my linear regression 
analysis, equation (3.11) is transformed by a log approximation: 
(3.13)    𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑖









) represents the industry-common level of the natural logarithm of ARPK in 
the absence of distortions. 
Based on the model specification, I investigate underlying sources that generate 
firm-specific distortions. More importantly, I aim to quantify how extensively this factor 
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will translate into distortions. In my complete empirical investigation, I implement the 
following regression: 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑖
𝑜 = 𝛽𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 +  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
ARPK. Following Dollar and Wei (2007), I define the ARPK as the ratio of value 
added to capital stock: 
(3.14)    𝐴𝑅𝑃𝐾𝑜 = 𝑉𝐴/𝐾     
Access to finance. Measures for access to finance constitute my first set of 
variables of interest. If firms operate optimally by equating MRPK with the cost of 
finance, those with a higher cost of finance should have a higher MRPK. As such, 
measures for access to finance should exhibit negative coefficients in my regression 
framework. Using information from the survey, I construct the following variables to 
measure firms’ financial constraints: 
 Bank account. This dummy variable equals one if the firm has a checking or 
savings account. 
 Credit line. This dummy variable equals one if the firm currently has a line of 
credit or loan. Sufi (2009) shows that the lack of access to a line of credit is a more 
statistically powerful measure of financial constraints than the traditional 
measures used in the literature. These two variables therefore capture the degree 
to which firms are connected to the financial market. 
 Work capital finance. This variable is constructed based on firms’ reports of the 
breakdown in their sources of financing for working capital. It measures the share 
of working capital cost financed by financial institutions and is constructed by 
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adding the share of working capital borrowed from private and state-owned banks 
and from nonbank financial institutions. It thus contrasts with self-financing or 
borrowing from informal money channels (such as friends and relatives) and 
purchasing on credit from suppliers and customers. 
 Fix asset finance. This variable measures the share of fixed investment financed 
by financial institutions. Similar to the previous variable, it is constructed using 
the information on the breakdown of firms’ sources of financing for fixed 
investments. I combine the sum of the percentage of borrowing from private and 
state-owned banks and borrowing from nonbank financial institutions. The higher 
this variable is, the more firms utilize formal financing channels to cover the cost 
of investment. 
 Bureaucracy. Measures for bureaucracy form my second set of variables of 
interest. In my analysis, bureaucracy and other government frictions can distort product 
market price. To mitigate the effects of bureaucracy, firms can interact with governments 
and pay bribes. As such, I expect that companies that spend less time and money 
combatting bureaucracy face larger distortions and hence exhibit higher MRPK. I use the 
following variables to measure the burden of bureaucracy and government interactions: 
 Time on government. To construct this variable, I utilize the following question 
from the Enterprise Survey: “In a typical week over the last 12 months, what 
percentage of total senior management time was spent in dealing with 
requirements imposed by government regulations?”   
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 Time on tax. To construct this variable, I employ the following question from the 
Enterprise Survey: “Over the last 12 months, how many times was this 
establishment either inspected by tax officials or required to meet with them?”  
 Informal payment. This variable measures the percentage of total annual sales 
informally paid on average to public officials to accomplish tasks related to 
customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, or services.   
 Ownership. The first control variable I use is ownership of a firm. As pointed out 
by Dollar and Wei (2007), government-owned firms can have easier access to finance 
and face less bureaucratic friction. On the other hand, government ownership is also 
associated with low operating efficiency (e.g., Megginson and Netter, 2001). To draw 
consistent inferences on the effects of access to finance and bureaucracy, it is therefore 
critical to include an indicator for government ownership. An advantage of the data is 
that it records the decomposition of ownership structure, which allows me to determine 
ownership types based on the actual breakdown of ownership rather than the firm-
ownership registration that is officially recorded. Nevertheless, an important shortcoming 
in my dataset needs to be addressed. In most parts of the Enterprise Survey, entirely state-
owned firms are intentionally omitted, which results in the proportion of wholly state-
owned firms being greatly underrepresented. In my sample, approximately 0.1% of the 
firms are wholly state owned, 0.4% are majority state owned, and 0.8% are minority state 
owned. As such, the indicator for government ownership captures largely partial state 
ownerships.   
External audit. This dummy variable indicates whether the establishment has its 
annual financial statement checked and certified by an external auditor. It measures a 
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firm’s level of information asymmetry: a firm that employs an external independent audit 
can send a good signal to potential lenders about the reliability and transparency of its 
financial statement. 
Female. Female is a dummy variable that equals one if at least one of the owners 
is female. Given that gender inequality in education and employment opportunities is 
prevalent in many developing countries (Dollar and Gatti, 1999) and that such inequality 
may reduce growth and development (Klasen, 1999), I examine whether firms with at 
least one female owner face higher distortion in capital and output markets than firms 
with only male owners. 
Exporter. A firm is defined as an exporter if its percentage of direct export to total 
sales exceeds 20%. Export captures a company’s level of integration within the global 
market. I expect that firms with a higher level of integration face fewer distortions, as the 
impact of any country-specific distortion is diluted at this wider stage.  
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics for these key variables. Panel A summarizes 
the measures for access to finance. In my sample, 86% of the firms have bank accounts 
(either checking or saving), but only 40% have lines of credits. Next, 23% of the firms 
finance fixed asset investments through financial institutions, although many 
observations are missing in relation to this variable (it has approximately 50% fewer than 
other variables). For the financing of working capital, 16% of the firms utilize financial 
institutions. Taken together, these statistics collectively suggest that a significant 
proportion of the firms in my sample do not have good access to finance. 
Panel B then summarizes the measures for bureaucracy. In my sample, managers 
on average spend nearly 10% of their time dealing with government-related issues; 
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however, the 3% median suggests a high level of heterogeneity among firms in relation 
to their interactions with the government. Similarly, the average number of tax agency 
visits and inspections is twice a year, with a median of once a year. Lastly, we can also 
see large variation in firms’ bribery activities. On average, a company pays approximately 
1% of its annual revenue informally to government personnel, and the standard deviation 
is 3%. These statistics collectively suggest a significant variation in firms’ efforts with 
regard to interacting with the government.   
Finally, Panels C and D summarize the key control variables. In my sample, most 
firms (89%) are owned by the private sector. Approximately 9% have foreign ownership, 
whereas only 1% of the firms are owned by governments. The average firm age is 21 
years (with a standard deviation of 16 years) and the average firm size is 114 employees 
(with a standard deviation of 413 employees). Approximately 14% of the companies are 
exporters, and around 52% employ external audit firms. Lastly, approximately 30% of 
the firms have at least one female owner. 
To assess the effects of access to finance and bureaucracy on firms’ returns to 
capital, I first conduct a univariate analysis; its results are reported in Table 3.4. I focus 
on the logarithm of ARPK (log(ARPK)), motivated by the econometric framework and to 
be consistent with the subsequent regression analyses that I undertake. Panels A through 
G compare log(ARPK) for the two groups defined by the groups’ criteria (namely bank 
account, credit line, percentage of fixed asset financed by institutions, working capital 
financed by institutions, time spent on government, time spent on tax agency, and 
percentage of revenue for informal government payment). When the criterion variable is 
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a continuous variable (as in Panels C to G), I define the low group as the first empirical 
quartile of the criterion variable and the high group as its fourth empirical quartile. 
The univariate analysis results indicate significant lower returns to capital for 
firms that have better access to finance and expend more effort on government. In the 
first four panels, the average log(ARPK) is significantly lower for firms that have either 
bank accounts or credit lines or utilize institutions more frequently to finance fix capital; 
however, I do not find a significant difference for the criterion of working capital financed 
by institutions. In the last three panels, the average log(ARPK) is also significantly lower 
for firms that have more interaction with government or the tax agency or pay higher 
percentages of their revenues as informal payments to government officials. In all cases, 
statistical significances are determined based on paired t-tests. 
I then proceed to conduct multivariate regressions to formally assess how these 
financial and administrative distortions affect return to capital. In Table 3.5, I report the 
estimates for the previously outlined regression specification; the dependent variable is 
log(ARPK). In the first two models, I include the measures for access to finance; however, 
I exclude Fix Asset Finance in Model (1) given that it has too many missing observations. 
In Model (3), I include measures only for bureaucracy. In the last two models, I include 
measures for both access to finance and bureaucracy. In all the models, I incorporate 
industry, country, and year-fixed effects. Given the nature of my sample, I report 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
The estimates in Table 3.5 indicate that finance and bureaucratic distortions have 
significant adverse effects on return to capital. The negative and significant coefficients 
for the measures of access to finance suggest that firms with better access to finance 
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exhibit lower returns to capital. Moreover, the negative and significant coefficients for 
the measures of bureaucracy suggest that firms that expend more effort with government 
exhibit lower returns to capital. Taken together, these results are consistent with my 
theoretical framework and demonstrate that access to finance and bureaucracy are key 
distortions for firms’ returns to capital. 
 The estimates for the control variables are informative as well. For instance, firm 
age is negatively associated with log(ARPK), which indicates that firms that are more 
mature have lower returns to capital. Seeing as older firms are normally associated with 
less information asymmetry, they enjoy lower costs of finance and exhibit lower returns 
to capital. Firm size, as measured by the number of total full-time employees, is 
statistically significant and positive in predicting the level of ARPK. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Dollar and Wei (2007) and Kalemli-Ozcan and Sorensen 
(2012), who respectively consider a sample of firms in China and a set of African 
countries. It is also in line with Busso and Madrigal (2013), who study the productivity 
of a sample of Latin American countries. The result suggests that to allocate resources 
most efficiently, capital should be reallocated from small to larger firms. In developing 
countries, small firms thus in fact have too much capital than they should have in the most 
efficient allocation. Firms that have their financial statements externally audited have a 
lower ARPK than those that do not. One plausible explanation is that undergoing an 
external independent audit sends a good signal to potential lenders about the reliability 
and transparency of a firm’s financial statement, which greatly facilitates the company’s 
borrowing. Moreover, it is interesting that my results indicate that gender may also play 
a role in the allocation of resources in developing countries. The significant coefficients 
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for female suggest that firms with at least one female owner tend to face a higher cost of 
capital than other firms. This is not surprising given that gender obstacles are still 
prevalent in developing countries. Moreover, the effect could be much larger if I consider 
the selection issue: to attain a top position, female owners must in most cases be 
exceptionally good at their jobs. 
In the previous section I employ OLS regressions to study the underlying sources 
of firms’ capital distortion based on cross-sectional data that covers more than 80 
developing countries. However, the OLS results, which focus only on the central 
tendency of ARPK distribution, do not allow for the possibility that the impact of 
explanatory variables can differ among firms with various degrees of distortion. In this 
section, I adopt the quantile regression method developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) 
to explore whether explanatory variables have asymmetric effects on firms depending on 
the severity of the distorted operating environment. The flexibility to allow varying 
coefficients is of importance to my study. First, return to capital can be thought of as a 
segmentation variable because firms lying in its distribution tails are considered highly 
distorted if they have either too much capital (i.e., low ARPK) or too little capital (i.e., 
high ARPK) relative to labor. Quantile regression enables me to trace the entire 
distribution of the level of ARPK and pay special attention to the highly distorted firms. 
Moreover, quantile regression is more robust to outliers, and such robustness is important 
in establishment-level survey studies in which globally collected datasets tend to contain 
outliers even after extreme observations are filtered out. Furthermore, quantile regression 
relaxes the central assumptions for least squares, namely homoscedasticity and normality. 
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On the basis of these grounds, quantile regression is ideally suited for studying the 
asymmetric effects.    
Table 3.6 reports the results of the quantile regression. Columns (1) through (5) 
report the estimation results for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles of the 
conditional distribution of log(ARPK). As such, the coefficients for the explanatory 
variables reflect their marginal effects for the firms that are in the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 
90th quantiles based on the distribution of log(ARPK). The explanatory variables include 
measures for both access to finance and bureaucracy as well as other control variables, 
but I exclude Fix Asset Finance due to the missing observation problem. As before, I 
include industry, country, and year-fixed effects and employ a robust estimator for the 
covariance matrix. 
 The coefficient estimates in Table 3.6 reveal significant asymmetric effects 
regarding access to finance. For the variables Bank Account and Credit Line, the 
coefficients in Model (5) are much smaller than those in Model (1), where I compare the 
marginal effect of having a bank account or credit line on the return to capital for firms 
that are already having (very) high or (very) low returns to capital. The table reveals that 
having a bank account can significantly reduce the return to capital by 29 percentage 
points for firms that already have high returns to capital, whereas the reduction is only 14 
percentage points for firms that already have low returns to capital. This sharp contrast 
once again reinforces the notion that access to finance is an important source of distortion 
in relation to firms’ productivity and demonstrates that the marginal gain in productivity 
is much higher for companies that are already constrained vis-à-vis finance. 
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V. Identifying sources of misallocation: Industry-level evidence 
 In this section, I examine the determinants of misallocation at the industry level. 
In line with the literature (e.g., Dollar and Wei, 2007), I use the dispersion of the 
logarithm of ARPK within an industry in a country year to measure that industry’s extent 
of capital allocative inefficiency. If capital is efficiently allocated, then ARPK should be 
equalized within a sector in a country. As such, a greater dispersion in log(ARPK) means 
a greater level of distortion in capital. 
In calculating the industry-country specific standard deviation of log(ARPK), I 
exclude industries that contain fewer than six firms; this helps to ensure that the dispersion 
of ARPK reflects the distortion rather than the influence of a few extreme values. I include 
a total of 615 industry-country observations, and the mean spread over the entire sample 
is approximately 1.27 (with a standard deviation of 0.3). 
To explore the determinants of industry-level capital allocative inefficiency, I 
estimate an OLS regression with the standard deviation of log(ARPK) as the dependent 
variable. The main variables of interest include the dispersions of access to finance and 
bureaucratic friction at the industry level. I also include the same set of control variables 
as in my firm-level analyses. As I do when I measure the dispersion for return to capital, 
I measure the dispersions of these explanatory variables with their within-industry 
standard deviations.  
My decision to use the dispersions of these explanatory variables (as opposed to 
their average levels) is consistent with my examination of the dispersion of return to 
capital. The average level of access to finance or bureaucratic friction within an industry 
should not have a direct impact on the dispersion of return to capital within that industry. 
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It should instead be expected that if the firms within an industry have heterogeneous 
access to finance, they will exhibit distinct returns to capital. Even if the average level of 
access to finance within an industry is poor, as long as firms have homogenous access to 
finance, dispersed returns to capital should not be expected. 
Table 3.7 reports the results of the industry-level regression. The regression 
specification is the same as in Table 3.5: in the first two models, I only include measures 
for access to finance; in the third model, I only incorporate measures for bureaucracy; 
and in the last two models, I include both sets of measures. The standard errors are 
calculated with heteroskedasticity robust estimators. 
 The coefficient estimates in Table 3.7 are consistent with my firm-level evidence 
that access to finance and bureaucracy are key determinants of capital misallocation. The 
significantly positive coefficients for the standard deviation of bank account in Models 
(1) and (2) indicate that in an industry where the heterogeneity of firms’ access to bank 
account increases, the dispersion of return to capital increases as well. Next, in Model (5) 
it is evident that the coefficients for the standard deviation of both the time spent on 
government and the percentage of revenue for informal payment are positive and 
significant. These estimates suggest that in an industry in which the heterogeneity in 




 Capital allocation efficiency plays a key role in determining total factor 
productivity and hence economic growth. Nevertheless, capital misallocation is pervasive 
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across countries, especially in the developing world. Misallocation can occur if firms face 
distortions in their input and output markets. Distortions in the input market (e.g., the 
market for capital goods) can exist in the form of financial frictions, seeing as firms equate 
their marginal products of capital to their user cost of capital. Distortions in the output 
market can exist in the form of bureaucratic frictions, such as red tape and bribes.  
 In this paper, I study the degree and determinants of investment efficiency across 
firms using a comprehensive firm-level survey dataset that covers a wide spectrum of 
developing countries. I document that capital misallocation, as measured by the 
dispersion in firms’ MRPK, is pervasive in firms within the same industry in a country. I 
find that limited access to finance, bureaucracy, information asymmetry, and gender 
inequality play important roles in impeding the most efficient allocation of capital across 
firms. By employing the quantile regression technique, I show that these factors exert 
greater effects on already highly distorted firms (i.e., those with too little capital). I further 
find that the industry-level dispersion in return to capital increases in firms’ 
heterogeneities in the financial constraints and bureaucratic frictions that they face. These 
results have direct policy implications; in particular, governments could achieve a more 
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Appendix: Figures and Tables 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics on acquisitions in oil and gas sectors during the period of 
1985—2015. I obtain all announcements of acquisitions in oil and gas sectors from the Thomson 
Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. To 
identify oil and gas sector acquisitions, I restrict my sample to transactions whose bidders or 
bidders’ ultimate parents are in oil and gas industry, and whose targets are in oil and gas industry. 
I exclude leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, spin-offs, self-tender offers, exchange offers and 
repurchases. I also exclude bidders that domicile in tax havens including the Bahamas, British 
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey and Netherland Antilles. I further 






Total No. of Deals 14,793 1,445 
No. of Deals with Values Disclosed 9,236 660 
Average Deal Value (in Millions, constant 2000 Dollars) 219 699 
Total Deal Value (in Millions, constant 2000 Dollars) 2,023,432 461,530 
No. of Withdrawn Deals 608 70 
Percentage of Withdrawn Deals 4.11% 4.84% 
No. of Complete Control Deals 7,798 379 
Percentage of Complete Control Deals (out of available 
control observations) 71.31% 40.97% 
No. of Minority Block Purchase 2,304 422 
Percentage of Minority Deals (out of available share 
acquired data) 21.21% 46.48% 
No. of Public Target 2,142 219 
Percentage of Public Target  14.48% 15.16% 
No. of Cross Border Deals 4,774 775 
Percentage of Cross Border Deals 32.27% 53.68% 
Number of Bidders from Oil Poor Countries 3,896 479 









Table 1.3: Deal premium measures for government bidders and private sector 
bidders 
This table presents average deal premia paid by government-owned bidders and private sector 
bidders in the oil and gas sectors for period 1985—2015. FBC is the first bid to completion 
premium measure of Schwert (1996). CAR3 and CAR5 denote cumulative abnormal returns for 
a 3-day and a 5-day windows respectively. ***, **, and * indicates significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels based on a test against zero in columns “Government” and “Private-Sector” and based 
on a paired-test in column “Diff”. 
Panel A: All deals 
 Government Private-sector Diff 
FBC 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.11*** 
CAR3 0.1*** 0.14*** 0.4** 
CAR5 0.1*** 0.15*** 0.05*** 
N 110 758  
Panel B: Domestic Deals 
 Government Private-Sector Diff 
FBC 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.05 
CAR3 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.06*** 
CAR5 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 
N 40 544  
Panel C: Foreign Deals 
 Government Private-Sector Diff 
FBC 0.1*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 
CAR3 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.06** 
CAR5 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.06** 















Table 1.7: Government ownership and deal premium: Domestic deals versus cross 
border deals 
FBC is the first bid to completion premium measure of Schwert (1996). CAR3 and CAR5 denote 
cumulative abnormal returns for 3-day and 5-day windows, respectively. 𝜆 is the inverse Mills 
ratio for government acquisition, constructed from the probit regression in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. Robust P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
  Domestic Deals   Cross Border Deals 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FBC CAR3 CAR5  FBC CAR3 CAR5 
Government 0.212* -0.005 -0.008  -0.011 0.021 -0.003 
 (0.079) (0.879) (0.834)  (0.926) (0.813) (0.973) 
Sought (%) -0.001 0.001** 0.000  0.004 0.001 0.002 
 (0.625) (0.053) (0.658)  (0.259) (0.504) (0.261) 
Cash Deal 0.045 0.023 0.037  0.160 0.053 0.078** 
 (0.630) (0.487) (0.223)  (0.126) (0.134) (0.024) 
Tender Offer 0.040 0.040 0.042  -0.087 -0.025 -0.052 
 (0.613) (0.151) (0.156)  (0.318) (0.652) (0.348) 
Termination Fee  -0.095 -0.050 -0.062  0.043 -0.044 0.005 
 (0.222) (0.240) (0.195)  (0.788) (0.484) (0.946) 
Bidder (#) 0.065 -0.062 -0.077*  0.227*** -0.048 -0.005 
 (0.628) (0.185) (0.089)  (0.010) (0.298) (0.907) 
log(TA) -0.015 -0.009 -0.007  0.030 0.018 0.016 
 (0.330) (0.276) (0.375)  (0.276) (0.275) (0.247) 
ROA -0.004* -0.000 -0.001  -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.097) (0.678) (0.367)  (0.312) (0.766) (0.712) 
Leverage -0.031 0.141 0.112  -0.150 -0.135 -0.071 
 (0.920) (0.159) (0.276)  (0.335) (0.244) (0.536) 
Q -0.033 -0.003 -0.014  -0.004 0.012 0.018 
 (0.495) (0.839) (0.391)  (0.933) (0.709) (0.591) 
BHAR -0.214*** -0.003 -0.014  -0.287** -0.090*** -0.085** 
 (0.007) (0.924) (0.610)  (0.011) (0.008) (0.026) 
Minority Block -0.020 0.024 -0.064  0.233 -0.077 0.001 
 (0.891) (0.681) (0.376)  (0.369) (0.540) (0.993) 
Zero Dividend -0.002 0.016 0.028  -0.000 0.006 0.013 
 (0.965) (0.379) (0.146)  (0.997) (0.914) (0.817) 
High Close-  -0.014 -0.022 -0.007  -0.113 -0.022 -0.010 
Held Share (0.866) (0.382) (0.767)  (0.209) (0.581) (0.827) 
Per Capita GDP 0.037 -0.015 -0.009  0.006 -0.021 -0.017 
Target Nation (0.441) (0.185) (0.477)  (0.906) (0.500) (0.605) 
Real Oil Price -0.025*** -0.006*** -0.006***  0.002 0.002 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.814) (0.660) (0.303) 
lambda 0.196* 0.039 0.053  0.050 0.071** 0.046 
 (0.068) (0.333) (0.162)  (0.524) (0.045) (0.129) 
Constant 0.444 0.169 0.223  -0.695 -0.067 -0.228 
 (0.236) (0.319) (0.194)  (0.100) (0.771) (0.283)         
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 360  160 160 160 




Table 1.8: The cross section of government ownership and deal premium 
This table reports estimates for determinants of deal premium based on a sample of completed 
acquisitions in the oil and gas sectors for period 1985—2015. FBC is the first bid to completion 
premium measure of Schwert (1996). CAR3 and CAR5 denote cumulative abnormal returns for 
3-day and 5-day windows, respectively. Government is a 0-1 indicator, which takes value 1 if the 
bidder is government-owned. 𝜆 is the inverse Mills ratio for government acquisition, constructed 
from the probit regression in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust P-values are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicates significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FBC CAR3 CAR5 
Government 0.029 0.004 0.033 
 (0.862) (0.958) (0.717) 
Government×Cross Border -0.236*** 0.009 0.017 
 (0.001) (0.792) (0.639) 
Government×Bidder Nation Common Law 0.077 0.027 -0.003 
 (0.617) (0.668) (0.968) 
Government×Bidder Nation Democracy 0.375*** 0.034 0.021 
 (0.003) (0.657) (0.789) 
Government×Bidder Nation Oil Poor -0.011 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.260) (0.809) (0.474) 
Government×Stake 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.333) (0.534) (0.604) 
Cross Border 0.111** 0.068*** 0.073*** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.000) 
Bidder Nation Oil Poor -0.044 -0.023 -0.002 
 (0.529) (0.332) (0.932) 
Bidder Nation Common Law -0.339 0.012 0.036 
 (0.183) (0.917) (0.745) 
Bidder Nation Democracy -0.031 0.004 0.008 
 (0.347) (0.825) (0.643) 
Stake -0.001 0.002* 0.001 
 (0.651) (0.089) (0.280) 
𝜆 0.532 0.003 -0.027 
 (0.158) (0.988) (0.881) 
Constant -0.368 0.100 0.144 
 (0.491) (0.693) (0.563)     
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 520 520 520 
R-squared 0.263 0.212 0.212 
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Table 1.9: The cross section of government ownership and changes in operating 
performance 
The dependent variables in this table are changes in target operating performances for a sample 
of completed acquisitions in the oil and gas sectors for 1985—2015. I report the results for Return 
on assets, Return on equity, Leverage, Investment, and cash. For each performance measure, I 
examine change as the two-year average of the measure after the acquisition minus the two-year 
average of the measure before. Government is a 0-1 indicator, which takes value 1 if the bidder 
is government-owned. 𝜆 is the inverse Mills ratio for government acquisition, constructed from 
the probit regression in Table A2 in the Appendix. Robust P-values are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicates significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ROA ROE Leverage Investment Cash 
Gov. -5.082 -34.060 0.004 -0.010 0.051 
 (0.537) (0.152) (0.936) (0.888) (0.364) 
Gov.×Cross Border 0.956 3.011 0.057 0.017 -0.002 
 (0.821) (0.818) (0.191) (0.553) (0.955) 
Gov.×Bidder Nation Oil Poor 3.585 32.631** -0.010 0.021 -0.070** 
 (0.528) (0.028) (0.827) (0.624) (0.034) 
Gov.×Bidder Nation Common Law 2.504 31.012* -0.029 -0.010 0.044 
 (0.596) (0.069) (0.441) (0.859) (0.160) 
Gov.×Bidder Nation Democracy 0.608 1.960* -0.003 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.250) (0.078) (0.308) (0.703) (0.368) 
Gov.×Stake 0.030 0.032 0.000 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.610) (0.814) (0.826) (0.243) (0.046) 
Cross Border 0.062 -8.108 0.010 0.015 0.001 
 (0.985) (0.416) (0.643) (0.456) (0.957) 
Bidder Nation Oil Poor -1.150 -20.787 0.001 -0.017 0.036* 
 (0.817) (0.125) (0.970) (0.659) (0.068) 
Bidder Nation Common Law -3.390 -7.988 0.002 0.093 0.036 
 (0.475) (0.697) (0.955) (0.195) (0.206) 
Bidder Nation Democracy -0.737 -1.069 0.005 0.009* 0.002 
 (0.240) (0.523) (0.138) (0.062) (0.693) 
Stake -0.085 -0.205* 0.000 -0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.103) (0.080) (0.541) (0.061) (0.069) 
𝜆 5.130 -2.975 0.010 -0.070** -0.052** 
 (0.311) (0.816) (0.698) (0.049) (0.025) 
Constant 2.243 32.150 -0.062 -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.783) (0.157) (0.124) (0.851) (0.849) 
      
Observations 278 262 302 292 304 
R-squared 0.028 0.078 0.029 0.070 0.073 
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Table 1.A1: Description of the Explanatory Variables in the Empirical Analyses 
VARIABLES Source Definition 
Deal Value  SDC Total value of the equity investment, 
in 2000 U.S. dollars (adjusted using 
the consumer price index, CPI) 
Total Assets (log): Worldscope, WC02999  Book value of total assets in millions 
of constant 2000 US dollars (adjusted 
using the consumer price index, CPI) 
Return on assets (ROA) Worldscope, WC08326 Net income/total assets 
Sales Growth Worldscope, WC01001  
 
“Net sales” or “Revenue” minus the 
previous year’s “Net sales” or 
“Revenue” then divided by the 
previous year’s “Net sales” or 
“Revenue” 







(Book value of total assets -book 
value of equity + market value of 
equity)/book value of assets 
Cross Border SDC Binary variable, set equal to one if the 
bidder country and target country of 
headquarters are not the same 
Stock Return DataStream, RI Daily percentage change in the total 
return index (RI), in U.S. dollars. 
Market index return DataStream, TOTMK Country level daily percentage change 
in the total return market index  
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Target BHAR DataStream, RI Buy and hold abnormal return, market 
adjusted in previous year 
Minority Block 
Acquisition Dummy  
 
SDC Equals 1 if the deal is a minority block 
purchase (less than 50% of target 
firm’s shares) and 0 if the deal is 
majority control acquisition  
Real Oil Price Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis 
 
Global price of WTI crude, deflated 
using the consumer price index (CPI) 
Bidder Nation Oil Poor Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) 
Binary variable, set equal to one if an 
bidder county’s dependence on 
foreign oil ratio is greater than 50%. 
Dependence on foreign oil ratio is 
calculated using net oil import divided 
by oil consumption 
Target country GDP per 
capita 
World Bank GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear 
population. Data are in constant 2005 
U.S. dollars. 
Target country GDP 
growth 
World Bank Year-to-year change in GDP per 
capita for the country in which the 
target’s headquarters are located. Data 
are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. 
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Target Nation Common 
Law 
La Porta et al. (1998) Binary variable, equal to one if the 




Polity IV Project “Democracy” minus “Autarchy” score 
for the relevant country 
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Table 1.A2: Determinants of Government Acquisitions 
This table presents estimates for probit regressions on government acquisition in the oil and gas 
sectors for period 1985—2015 (the dependent variable). Variable definitions are in Table A1 of 
Appendix. Robust P-Values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates significant at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Government Bidder 
Sought (%) -0.003+ 
 (0.084) 
Cash Deal 0.235 
 (0.111) 
Tender Offer -0.096 
 (0.574) 
Termination Fee  -0.101 
 (0.688) 












Target Nation Democracy -0.015 
 (0.507) 
Bidder Nation Democracy -0.122** 
 (0.000) 











Figure 2.1: Index of economic policy uncertainty 
This figure shows the time series plot of the economic policy uncertainty index for 1985--2015. 





Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
This table documents summary statistics for variables used in this study. In Panel A, we report 
firm characteristics, and the data is from Compustat quarterly in the period 1986—2015. Leverage 
is the book leverage. In Panel B, we report the economic variables used in our analysis. In Panel 
C, we report the summary for bond characteristics. We obtain the bond issuance data from 
Mergent FISD. Rating is the ordinal S&P rating and is given by the following transformation: 
AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA-=4, A+=5, A=6, A-=7, BBB+=9, BBB-=10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB-
=13, B+=14, B=15, B-=16. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Ratios are winsorized at the 
one percent level. 
Variable N Mean S.D. Median 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Leverage 329,834 0.26 0.24 0.19 
EBITDA/TA 329,834 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Tangible Assets/TA 329,834 0.33 0.24 0.27 
Market-to-Book 329,834 1.97 1.99 1.16 
Firm Size 329,834 6.26 1.82 6.05 
Industry Median Leverage 329,834 0.21 0.16 0.20 
Rated Dummy 329,834 0.30 0.46 0.00 
Dividend Dummy 329,834 0.10 0.30 0.00 
Panel B: Economic Variables 
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU) 
124 1.08 0.30 1.02 
News Component of EPU 123 1.08 0.34 1.00 
VIX Index (%) 120 20.66 8.09 19.45 
Panel C: Bond Characteristics 
Credit Spread (Baa-Aaa) 120 0.99 0.38 0.92 
Offering Yield (%) 6869 7.43 3.27 7.13 
Rating 6869 8.31 3.36 8.00 
Stock Volatility 6656 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Treasury Yield (%) 6869 4.75 2.10 4.73 




Table 2.2: Univariate analysis  
This table presents univariate analysis of book leverage with respect to high and low regimes of 
EPU, which is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). We define high EPU 
regimes as the quarters when the EPU index is above its 75th percentile and low regimes as the 
rest of the quarters. In Panel A, we report the mean and median of book leverage for the whole 
sample and for both EPU regimes and report the differences over the two regimes. In Panels B, 
C, and D, we report the mean of book leverage for size, book leverage, and market-to-book (M-
B) quartiles and the mean conditional on both EPU regimes, respectively. In panel E, we report 
the mean of book leverage conditional on election year and for both EPU regimes. See Appendix 
A for variable definitions. Ratios are winsorized at the one percent level. ***, **, and * stand for 




Table 2.3: Does economic policy uncertainty affect corporate leverage? 
This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable across all the columns is book leverage.  
EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). Other variable definitions 
are in Appendix A. We use Compustat quarterly sample covering 1986--2015. P values calculated 
using cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
EPU -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Recession Dummy -0.002* 0.000 0.001 
 (0.086) (0.955) (0.198) 
VIX Index -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.323) 
EBITDA/TA -0.142*** -0.176*** -0.168*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible Assets/TA 0.081*** 0.136*** 0.128*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book 0.001 -0.000 0.002*** 
 (0.225) (0.663) (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.030*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Median Industry Leverage 0.457*** 0.322*** 0.235*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Election Year -0.002** -0.001* -0.002** 
 (0.030) (0.079) (0.033) 
Constant 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.955) 
    
Year FE                                        Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No 
Firm FE No No Yes 
Observations 329,834 329,834 329,834 




Table 2.4: Does public debt market access moderate the effect of economic policy 
uncertainty? 
This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable across all the columns is book 
leverage. In Model (1), we utilize the full sample. In Model (2), we focus on a subsample of 
rated firms. EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). Other variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. We use Compustat quarterly sample covering 1986--2015. P 
values calculated using cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
EPU -0.007*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) 
EPU*Rated 0.004  
 (0.290)  
Rated 0.076***  
 (0.000)  
EPU* Invest.Grade  0.015** 
  (0.013) 
Invest.Grade  -0.084*** 
  (0.000) 
Recession Dummy 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.165) (0.692) 
VIX Index -0.000 0.000** 
 (0.284) (0.047) 
EBITDA/TA -0.163*** -0.170*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible Assets/TA 0.128*** 0.035* 
 (0.000) (0.079) 
Market-to-Book 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.020*** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.722) 
Median Industry Leverage 0.227*** 0.191*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend  0.020*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) 
Election Year -0.001* -0.004*** 
 (0.071) (0.001) 
Constant 0.037** 0.379*** 
 (0.036) (0.000) 
   
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 340,168 102,013 





Table 2.6: Economic policy uncertainty and debt maturity 
This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable across all the columns is the ratio of 
long-term debt over total debt. Other variable definitions are in Appendix A. In Models (1) and 
(2), we utilize the full sample. In Model (3), we focus on a subsample of rated firms. We use 
Compustat quarterly sample covering 1986—2015. P values calculated using cluster robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
EPU -0.009* -0.019*** -0.029*** 
 (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) 
EPU*Rated  0.049***  
  (0.000)  
Rated  0.055***  
  (0.000)  
EPU* Invest.Grade   0.053*** 
   (0.000) 
Invest.Grade   -0.115*** 
   (0.000) 
VIX Index -0.000* 0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.065) (0.893) (0.013) 
GDP Growth 0.737*** 0.175** 0.212** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.013) 
EBITDA/TA 0.053 0.045 -0.121** 
 (0.154) (0.226) (0.025) 
Tangible Assets/TA 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.127*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.179) (0.174) (0.065) 
Firm Size 0.043*** 0.025*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.409*** 0.512*** 0.932*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 329,834 329,834 99,542 
R-squared 0.094 0.113 0.089 
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Table 2.7: Instrumental variable analysis of economic policy uncertainty 
This table reports the estimates of our IV regression. The dependent variable across all the 
columns is book leverage. EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). 
We instrument EPU with political polarization, where the first stage estimates are in Appendix 
B. Other variable definitions are in Appendix We use Compustat quarterly sample for 1986—
2015. P values calculated using two-way clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
EPU -0.055*** -0.072*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Recession Dummy -0.004*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.640) 
VIX Index 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) 
EBITDA/TA -0.127*** -0.158*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible Assets/TA 0.085*** 0.141*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book 0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) 
Firm Size 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Median Industry Leverage  0.462*** 0.348*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend 0.061*** 0.062*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Election Year  -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.012) (0.024) 
Constant 0.082*** 0.090*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Industry FE No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 329,834 329,834 
R-squared 0.206 0.239 
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Table 2.8: Does economic policy uncertainty affect leverage and debt issuances 
based on policy uncertainty sensitivity? 
In Panel A, we report OLS estimation results. The dependent variable is leverage. In Panel B, we 
report estimation results for a duration model, where the dependent variable is the length of the 
time periods between two debt issuances. The sample is Compustat quarterly data for 1986—
2015. EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). Policy (sensitivity) is 
an indicator variable, which takes value one if a firm is in either the energy or the defense industry. 
In Model (2) and Model (3), the coefficients of policy are omitted due to collinearity. Other 
variable definitions are in Appendix A. The duration spell accounts for right censoring. 𝐻𝐼 
measures the hazard impact and is defined as 𝐻𝐼𝑖 = (exp(𝛽𝑖) − 1) × 100. P values calculated 
using cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Leverage  Debt Issuance Duration 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) HI 
EPU -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009***  -0.009*** -0.90% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
EPU*Policy Sensitivity -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.024***  -0.117* -11.04% 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.056)  
Policy Sensitivity -0.019*    0.352*** 42.20% 
 (0.099)    (0.000)  
Recession -0.002* -0.000 -0.000  -0.235*** -20.94% 
 (0.088) (0.956) (0.956)  (0.000)  
VIX Index -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.007*** -0.70% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
EBITDA/TA -0.144*** -0.176*** -0.176***  0.561*** 75.24% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
Tangible Assets/TA 0.102*** 0.136*** 0.136***  0.088*** 9.20% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)  
Market-to-Book 0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.023*** -2.27% 
 (0.391) (0.651) (0.651)  (0.000)  
Firm Size 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016***  -0.054*** -5.26% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
Median Industry 
Leverage 
0.448*** 0.323*** 0.323***  0.730*** 107.51% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
Dividend 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.059***  0.043** 4.39% 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.015)  
Election Year -0.002** -0.001* -0.001*  -0.002 -0.20% 
 (0.037) (0.081) (0.081)  (0.874)  
Constant 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.053***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
       
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes    
Industry Fixed No Yes No    
Firm Fixed No No Yes    
Observations 329,834 329,834 329,834  329,834  
R-squared 0.212 0.246 0.246  0.246  
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Table 2.9: Credit spread and economic policy uncertainty 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the aggregate credit spread, the difference between Baa and 
Aaa corporate bond yields. EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. 2013. 
Control variables include VIX index, GDP growth, and NBER Recession dummies. In Panel B, 
we examine the bond level credit spread, defined as the difference between bond issuance yield 
and matched Treasury bond yield. The control variable rating is the ordinal S&P rating and is 
given by the following transformation: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA-=4, A+=5, A=6, A-=7, 
BBB+=9, BBB-=10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB-=13, B+=14, B=15, B-=16. In Panel A, P values 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. In Panel B, P values 
calculated using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported. ***, **, and * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Aggregate Credit Spread 
 (1) 




VIX Index 0.016** 
 (0.000) 
GDP growth -14.974*** 
 (0.008) 







Panel B: Bond-level credit spread 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EPU 1.064*** 1.005*** 1.152*** 0.857*** 0.815*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book Leverage 5.464*** 5.246*** 5.476*** 4.634*** 4.776*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-book 0.202*** 0.0207 0.255*** 0.124*** 0.114*** 
 (0.000) (0.523) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size -2.492*** -4.884*** -1.667*** -1.250*** -0.939*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EBITDA/TA   -4.465*** -2.587*** -2.350*** 
   (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) 
Rating   0.156*** 0.0814*** 0.0790*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Benchmark Treasury rate (%)    -0.380*** -0.356*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Excess return volatility    66.42*** 70.51*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible Asset/TA     -0.457*** 
     (0.000) 
Constant 4.527*** 7.958*** 0.399 2.863*** 2.217*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.432) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Year Fixed Effects   No   Yes   Yes   Yes  Yes 
Observations 6,862 6,862 5,414 5,276 5,190 
R-squared 0.190 0.419 0.456 0.487 0.502 
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Table 2.10: Simultaneous regression estimates for leverage, investment, and EPU 
This table reports the simultaneous regression estimates for book leverage, investment, and EPU. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. The sample used here is Compustat quarterly data for 
1986—2015. Robust P values from three-stage least square estimates are reported in parentheses. 
RMSE denotes the root mean squared error. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
VARIABLES Leverage  VARIABLES Investment  VARIABLES EPU 
EPU -0.132**  EPU -0.024**  Polarization 1.233** 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Investment 8.608**  Leverage 0.074**    
 (0.000)   (0.000)    
Recession -0.040**  Q 0.001**    
 (0.000)   (0.000)    
VIX Index 0.003**  Cash Flow 0.075**    
 (0.000)   (0.000)    
EBITDA/TA -0.843**       
 (0.000)       
Tangible Assets/TA -1.821**       
 (0.000)       
Market-to-Book -0.025**       
 (0.000)       
Firm Size 0.068**       
 (0.000)       
Median Industry Leverage 1.324**       
 (0.000)       
Dividend 0.160**       
 (0.000)       
Constant -0.064**  Constant 0.044**  Constant 0.111** 
 (0.008)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Observations 294,768   294,768   294,768 
RMSE 0.728     0.057     0.282 
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Table 2.11: Leverage and economic policy uncertainty: subsample analysis on 
firms with no substantial changes in investment 
No substantial change in investment is defined as less than 1 percent change in investment. The 
dependent variable across all the columns is book leverage. Other variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. The sample used here is Compustat quarterly data for 1986—2015. P values 
calculated using two-way clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
     
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPU -0.026*** -0.015** -0.023*** -0.012** 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.048) 
Recession Dummy -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.337) (0.479) (0.488) (0.738) 
VIX Index -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.140) (0.558) (0.447) (0.158) 
EBITDA/TA 0.011 -0.026 0.001 -0.039 
 (0.750) (0.457) (0.985) (0.326) 
Tangible Assets/TA 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.186*** 0.180*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.129) (0.335) (0.619) (0.939) 
Firm Size 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Median Industry Leverage 0.459*** 0.446*** 0.366*** 0.334*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend Dummy 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.026** -0.061*** -0.013 -0.089*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.392) (0.000) 
     
Industry FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
N 126,619 126,619 126,619 126,619 
R-squared 0.230 0.235 0.268 0.273 
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Table 2.12: Firm leverage and economic policy uncertainty: quantile regression 
estimation 
The dependent variable in columns is the conditional book leverage at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 
90th percentiles, respectively. EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). 
Other variable definitions are in Appendix A. We use Compustat quarterly sample covering 
1986—2015. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EPU -0.003 -0.006** -0.013*** -0.011** -0.011* 
 (0.175) (0.033) (0.000) (0.013) (0.098) 
Recession Dummy -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.001 
 (0.712) (0.430) (0.876) (0.297) (0.791) 
VIX Index -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000 
 (0.074) (0.007) (0.003) (0.038) (0.652) 
EBITDA/TA -0.069*** -0.098*** -0.129*** -0.209*** -0.247*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible Assets/TA 0.076*** 0.130*** 0.160*** 0.127*** 0.098*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.000* 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Median Industry Leverage 0.106*** 0.274*** 0.405*** 0.392*** 0.335*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend 0.033*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.069*** 0.085*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Election Year 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.491) (0.871) (0.852) (0.595) (0.505) 
Constant -0.088*** -0.137*** -0.072*** 0.193*** 0.468*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 329,834 329,834 329,834 329,834 329,834 
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Table 2.14: Leverage and economic policy uncertainty: alternative EPU measures 
The dependent variable across all the columns is book leverage. In column (1), we use the news 
component of the EPU Index. In column (2), we use the tax component of the EPU index. In 
column (3), we use the CPI component of the EPU index. Other variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. We use Compustat quarterly sample covering 1986--2015. P values calculated using 
cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
EPU News -0.022***   
 (0.000)   
EPU Tax  -0.001***  
  (0.000)  
EPU CPI   -0.001 
   (0.344) 
Recession -0.001 -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.434) (0.000) (0.000) 
VIX Index 0.001*** -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.059) (0.173) 
EBITDA/TA -0.466*** -0.466*** -0.466*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible Asset/TA 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Median Industry Leverage 0.610*** 0.609*** 0.608*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Election 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.063*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 329,834 329,834 329,834 
R-squared 0.308 0.308 0.308 
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Table 2.15: Market leverage and economic policy uncertainty 
This table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable across all the columns is market 
leverage. EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). Other variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. We use Compustat quarterly sample covering 1986--2015. P 
values calculated using cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
EPU -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.029*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Recession Dummy -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.439) (0.877) (0.763) 
VIX Index 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EBITDA/TA -0.424*** -0.465*** -0.420*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible Assets/TA 0.058*** 0.145*** 0.186*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Median Industry Leverage 0.674*** 0.608*** 0.501*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend  0.098*** 0.102*** 0.054*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Election Year  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.104*** 0.078*** -0.083*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes No 
Firm FE No No Yes 
Observations 329,834 329,834 329,834 
R-squared 0.295 0.308 0.694 
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Table 2.16: Dynamic leverage adjustments and economic policy uncertainty 
This table reports estimates of 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛾𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡. In Panel 
A, we choose book leverage as the dependent variable. In Panel B, we choose market leverage as 
the dependent variable. EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013). In 
each panel, we report the estimates of the above-mentioned dynamic panel regression with the 
firm fixed effect (FE) estimator in column (1) and the estimates with the Blundell-Bond (BB) 
estimator in column (2). In columns (3) and (4), we report the estimates by including year fixed 
effects. Other control variables are the same as those in Table 17. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. We use Compustat quarterly sample covering 1986--2015. P values calculated using 
robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Book Leverage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE BB FE BB 
Leverage(t-1) 0.882*** 0.838*** 0.880*** 0.852*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EPU -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.212) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
Panel B: Market Leverage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE BB FE BB 
Leverage(t-1) 0.883*** 0.915*** 0.884*** 0.930*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EPU -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.031*** -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes 
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Table 2.B1: First Stage Instrumental Variable Regression 
The dependent variable is the EPU index. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. We use 
Compustat quarterly sample covering 1986--2015. P values calculated using cluster robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significantly different from zero at the 
one percent, five percent, and ten percent confidence level. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES EPU EPU 
Polarization  1.273*** 1.320*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Recession 0.103*** 0.093*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
VIX Index 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
EBITDA/TA 0.094*** 0.120*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangible Assets/TA 0.003 0.023*** 
 (0.309) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Size -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Median Industry Leverage 0.133*** 0.381*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividend 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.190*** -0.310*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Industry FE No  Yes 
Observations 158,100 158,100 
R-squared 0.352 0.362 
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Figure 3.1: Geographical distribution of the countries 
This figure shows the geographical distribution of firms in my sample. The region categories are 
Sub-Sahara Africa (AFR), Europe, and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean 
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Figure 3.2: Country income distribution 
This figure shows the distribution for the countries based on their incomes. The income groups 















Figure 3.3: Firm size distribution 
This figure shows the distribution for firm sizes. Small firms are defined as firms with 20 or fewer 
employees. Medium firms are defined as firms hiring more than 20 but fewer than 100 employees. 





Small (<20) Medium (20 to 100) Large (>100)
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Table 3.1: Country-level summary of MRPK 
This table shows the summary of marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) for each country 
and year in my sample. The column Firm # reports the number of firms in this country year. S.D. 
is the standard deviation of MRPK for all the firms in this country year. Median is the median 
MRPK in this country year. Wedge is the country average wedge calculated by taking the mean 
value of firm wedges within a country. Wedge for firm i in industry s is the ratio of the firm’s 
MRPK to the industry median MRPK. Small, Mid, and Large represents the proportion of small, 
mid-sized, and large firms in the country. 
Year Country Firm # S.D. Median Wedge Small  Mid Large 
2006 Angola 198 2.98 0.67 2.82 0.83 0.15 0.02 
2006 Argentina 399 5.43 0.90 2.27 0.36 0.41 0.23 
2010 Argentina 443 2.95 0.78 2.14 0.27 0.40 0.33 
2013 Bangladesh 991 3.82 0.73 2.58 0.28 0.38 0.34 
2007 Bulgaria 372 2.62 0.82 2.07 0.37 0.42 0.20 
2006 Bolivia 208 3.98 0.76 2.43 0.50 0.36 0.14 
2009 Brazil 992 4.26 0.92 2.58 0.34 0.46 0.20 
2006 Botswana 105 4.05 0.63 3.17 0.50 0.31 0.19 
2006 Chile 430 4.11 0.95 2.61 0.34 0.47 0.19 
2010 Chile 571 4.16 0.97 2.30 0.31 0.42 0.27 
2009 Cote d'Ivoire 101 6.98 1.00 3.45 0.59 0.32 0.09 
2006 Congo 146 2.75 1.09 1.65 0.63 0.31 0.06 
2013 Congo 102 8.40 2.96 1.95 0.79 0.17 0.04 
2006 Colombia 546 3.74 1.10 2.13 0.50 0.39 0.11 
2010 Colombia 530 4.62 1.22 2.21 0.35 0.38 0.28 
2010 Costa Rica 181 2.66 0.51 2.69 0.37 0.43 0.20 
2006 Ecuador 243 3.01 0.62 2.03 0.44 0.35 0.21 
2013 Egypt 1295 3.88 0.79 2.51 0.37 0.40 0.23 
2015 Ethiopia 218 3.58 0.41 3.06 0.33 0.37 0.30 
2007 Ghana 278 3.30 0.84 2.13 0.65 0.24 0.11 
2013 Ghana 167 7.19 1.45 3.08 0.66 0.22 0.12 
2006 Guinea 123 7.30 2.03 2.37 0.86 0.10 0.04 
2006 Guatemala 262 4.65 0.86 2.81 0.42 0.39 0.19 
2010 Guatemala 207 5.38 0.66 3.03 0.37 0.31 0.32 
2006 Honduras 190 3.79 0.83 2.27 0.55 0.30 0.15 
2007 Croatia 145 2.80 0.66 2.05 0.47 0.30 0.23 
2009 Indonesia 524 4.59 1.28 2.21 0.48 0.29 0.23 
2015 Indonesia 765 6.04 1.52 2.59 0.36 0.39 0.25 
2014 India 2769 5.31 1.29 2.47 0.29 0.50 0.21 
2011 Iraq 466 5.44 1.39 2.23 0.76 0.23 0.01 
2013 Israel 135 5.48 1.37 2.12 0.44 0.40 0.16 
2013 Jordan 241 6.81 1.29 3.19 0.37 0.32 0.32 
2007 Kenya 392 4.08 0.58 2.61 0.29 0.38 0.33 
2013 Kenya 207 5.57 1.22 3.20 0.26 0.40 0.34 
2009 Laos 288 5.53 0.93 2.79 0.51 0.32 0.18 
2013 Lebanon 121 5.46 1.07 2.39 0.41 0.45 0.14 
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2011 Sri Lanka 222 4.94 0.62 3.48 0.55 0.29 0.15 
2013 Morocco 103 6.69 1.49 2.33 0.17 0.33 0.50 
2009 Madagascar 106 5.41 0.45 4.11 0.30 0.48 0.22 
2006 Mexico 798 5.29 1.34 2.56 0.49 0.31 0.20 
2010 Mexico 946 5.23 1.12 2.55 0.35 0.33 0.32 
2007 Mali 296 3.16 0.94 1.98 0.78 0.20 0.02 
2014 Myanmar 177 5.50 0.91 2.86 0.55 0.32 0.12 
2009 Mongolia 113 1.83 0.46 2.03 0.26 0.48 0.27 
2007 Mozambique 274 3.38 0.50 3.74 0.62 0.31 0.06 
2015 Malaysia 286 7.23 2.14 2.03 0.24 0.39 0.37 
2007 Nigeria 918 5.19 1.49 2.20 0.68 0.28 0.04 
2014 Nigeria 238 8.94 2.56 2.27 0.71 0.24 0.05 
2006 Nicaragua 243 5.80 1.02 2.90 0.64 0.31 0.05 
2013 Nepal 216 4.89 0.97 3.19 0.37 0.46 0.18 
2013 Pakistan 183 9.38 2.10 2.82 0.46 0.40 0.14 
2006 Panama 129 4.40 0.84 3.74 0.52 0.36 0.12 
2006 Peru 232 5.48 1.07 2.66 0.38 0.42 0.20 
2010 Peru 506 4.29 1.18 2.17 0.29 0.39 0.32 
2009 Philippines 314 7.43 1.42 2.77 0.26 0.47 0.26 
2015 Philippines 247 6.69 1.20 2.68 0.36 0.36 0.28 
2006 Paraguay 127 4.18 0.50 3.31 0.42 0.50 0.09 
2009 Russia 250 4.64 1.01 2.25 0.18 0.43 0.39 
2012 Russia 333 5.54 0.84 3.19 0.39 0.39 0.22 
2007 Senegal 250 3.77 0.96 2.08 0.77 0.16 0.07 
2006 El Salvador 290 3.43 0.80 2.61 0.39 0.37 0.24 
2014 Sweden 216 2.10 0.55 2.23 0.31 0.52 0.17 
2013 Tunisia 252 2.77 0.64 2.28 0.22 0.42 0.36 
2008 Turkey 405 4.82 0.64 3.38 0.25 0.41 0.34 
2013 Turkey 231 6.10 1.11 2.84 0.35 0.43 0.22 
2006 Tanzania 245 4.75 0.71 2.96 0.51 0.33 0.16 
2013 Tanzania 106 3.30 0.66 2.19 0.45 0.29 0.25 
2006 Uganda 290 4.29 0.42 4.04 0.61 0.31 0.08 
2008 Ukraine 134 5.57 0.61 3.03 0.37 0.34 0.30 
2006 Uruguay 149 3.77 0.77 2.56 0.44 0.48 0.09 
2010 Uruguay 155 3.93 1.09 2.80 0.37 0.39 0.24 
2009 Vietnam 541 4.21 0.75 2.79 0.14 0.41 0.45 
2015 Vietnam 373 3.66 0.70 2.53 0.26 0.38 0.36 
2007 South Africa 637 3.36 0.73 2.67 0.33 0.42 0.25 
2007 Zambia 286 3.42 0.76 2.28 0.45 0.37 0.18 
2013 Zambia 138 6.76 1.06 2.31 0.51 0.38 0.11 
2011 Zimbabwe 328 5.72 1.00 2.72 0.34 0.38 0.28 
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Table 3.2: Industry-level summary of MRPK 
This table presents industry classification of firms based on two-digit International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) Code defined by the United Nations Statistics Division. The column 
Firm # reports the number of firms in this country year. S.D. is the standard deviation of MRPK 
for all the firms in this country year. Median is the median MRPK in this country year. Wedge for 
firm i in industry s is the ratio of the firm’s MRPK to the industry median MRPK. Small, Mid, and 
Large represents the proportion of small, mid-sized, and large firms in the country. 
Panel A: Industry definitions 
Industry ISIC code Number of firms Percentage 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 24 2,052 8.89 
Fabricated Metal & Machinery 28, 29 3,194 13.84 
Garments 18 3,312 14.35 
Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 36 1,467 6.36 
Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 25, 26, 27 2,728 11.82 
Other Manufacturing  3,004 13.02 
Textiles 17 1,556 6.74 
Food 15 5,417 23.47 
Service   45, 50, 51, 52, 
55, 60, 63, 64, 72 
348 1.51 
Panel B: Industry summary of MRPK 
Year Industry Firm # S.D. Median Wedge Small  Mid Large 
2006 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 662 4.72 1.37 2.12 0.41 0.42 0.17 
2007 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 214 2.86 0.74 2.18 0.21 0.50 0.28 
2008 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 49 3.46 0.87 2.37 0.43 0.41 0.16 
2009 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 283 6.40 1.68 2.39 0.31 0.43 0.26 
2010 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 439 5.86 1.75 2.20 0.30 0.34 0.36 
2011 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 52 3.43 0.80 1.97 0.52 0.25 0.23 
2012 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 30 6.02 0.84 3.24 0.40 0.43 0.17 
2013 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 363 5.09 1.13 2.58 0.29 0.43 0.28 
2014 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 217 4.95 1.28 2.47 0.29 0.48 0.22 
2015 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 152 5.37 1.36 2.49 0.23 0.37 0.40 
2006 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 616 5.15 0.94 2.88 0.51 0.38 0.11 
2007 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 551 3.68 0.82 2.22 0.50 0.36 0.14 
2008 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 95 4.13 0.58 3.63 0.26 0.35 0.39 
2009 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 387 4.77 0.85 2.80 0.21 0.45 0.33 
2010 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 718 3.66 0.90 2.33 0.37 0.40 0.22 
2011 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 74 5.17 1.45 1.64 0.69 0.22 0.09 
2012 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 64 4.55 1.07 2.59 0.27 0.48 0.25 
2013 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 426 5.42 1.02 2.54 0.48 0.37 0.15 
2014 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 726 4.56 1.00 2.44 0.34 0.50 0.16 
2015 Fabricated Metal & Machinery 175 6.06 1.07 2.33 0.31 0.42 0.26 
2006 Garments 859 5.35 1.27 2.41 0.54 0.32 0.15 
2007 Garments 872 3.40 0.98 2.11 0.73 0.19 0.08 
2008 Garments 81 3.93 0.61 2.85 0.31 0.44 0.25 
2009 Garments 456 3.24 0.90 2.37 0.28 0.39 0.33 
2010 Garments 407 4.21 1.31 2.13 0.34 0.40 0.26 
2011 Garments 143 4.04 0.52 3.76 0.50 0.35 0.15 
2013 Garments 553 5.09 0.99 2.37 0.28 0.27 0.45 
2014 Garments 157 4.66 1.86 1.99 0.25 0.40 0.34 
2015 Garments 297 5.72 1.10 2.73 0.36 0.34 0.30 
2006 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 301 3.50 0.66 3.20 0.71 0.24 0.05 
2007 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 394 4.35 0.95 2.18 0.70 0.25 0.04 
2009 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 192 4.12 0.71 2.41 0.39 0.44 0.17 
2010 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 147 5.97 1.86 2.10 0.37 0.33 0.31 
2011 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 41 2.33 0.87 2.76 0.80 0.17 0.02 
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2012 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 27 7.62 1.07 4.27 0.52 0.26 0.22 
2013 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 314 5.45 1.02 2.35 0.57 0.34 0.09 
2014 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 92 8.55 0.95 2.45 0.51 0.42 0.07 
2015 Manufacture of Furniture n.e.c 64 2.19 0.67 1.69 0.45 0.28 0.27 
2006 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 548 4.24 0.76 2.82 0.53 0.33 0.14 
2007 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 239 4.47 1.08 2.20 0.42 0.38 0.20 
2008 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 66 5.32 0.59 3.48 0.27 0.48 0.24 
2009 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 450 5.44 0.93 2.47 0.28 0.44 0.28 
2010 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 487 4.50 0.72 2.69 0.27 0.35 0.38 
2011 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 225 7.21 1.92 2.60 0.65 0.27 0.08 
2012 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 49 2.75 0.82 2.26 0.49 0.31 0.20 
2013 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 680 5.95 0.89 3.15 0.33 0.44 0.23 
2014 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 827 5.74 1.27 2.53 0.36 0.45 0.19 
2015 Non-Metallic & Basic Metals 452 6.00 1.06 2.60 0.31 0.42 0.26 
2006 Other Manufacturing 508 4.50 0.68 2.77 0.50 0.34 0.16 
2007 Other Manufacturing 394 4.59 0.75 2.89 0.44 0.34 0.21 
2008 Other Manufacturing 18 4.41 0.31 2.65 0.50 0.28 0.22 
2009 Other Manufacturing 516 5.85 0.83 3.22 0.32 0.41 0.27 
2010 Other Manufacturing 337 4.36 0.86 2.91 0.32 0.37 0.31 
2011 Other Manufacturing 106 4.85 0.67 3.07 0.61 0.29 0.09 
2012 Other Manufacturing 126 4.76 0.68 3.41 0.40 0.40 0.20 
2013 Other Manufacturing 795 4.46 0.79 2.73 0.40 0.38 0.22 
2014 Other Manufacturing 774 5.51 1.10 2.65 0.32 0.51 0.18 
2015 Other Manufacturing 288 6.25 1.15 2.24 0.28 0.41 0.31 
2008 Service Coarse 15 3.16 1.56 1.43 0.27 0.33 0.40 
2009 Service Coarse 206 5.43 1.12 2.29 0.60 0.29 0.11 
2010 Service Coarse 27 2.36 0.76 1.73 0.56 0.33 0.11 
2011 Service Coarse 10 6.41 3.51 2.53 0.50 0.50  
2012 Service Coarse 7 14.60 1.49 6.90 0.57 0.29 0.14 
2013 Service Coarse 151 7.43 1.59 2.49 0.43 0.43 0.14 
2014 Service Coarse 23 9.97 3.79 2.48 0.70 0.22 0.09 
2006 Textiles 534 4.02 0.88 2.57 0.45 0.38 0.17 
2007 Textiles 76 1.18 0.53 1.73 0.45 0.26 0.29 
2008 Textiles 96 5.92 0.58 3.66 0.14 0.36 0.50 
2009 Textiles 290 3.84 0.94 2.60 0.38 0.40 0.21 
2010 Textiles 230 2.07 0.63 2.24 0.34 0.39 0.27 
2011 Textiles 28 3.24 0.78 2.51 0.50 0.25 0.25 
2013 Textiles 398 5.13 0.55 2.58 0.27 0.41 0.33 
2014 Textiles 241 5.93 1.80 2.23 0.23 0.48 0.29 
2015 Textiles 114 5.90 0.87 4.00 0.40 0.32 0.27 
2006 food 1323 4.21 0.78 2.69 0.45 0.37 0.19 
2007 food 1107 4.23 0.86 2.71 0.47 0.37 0.16 
2008 food 115 6.21 0.73 3.59 0.31 0.37 0.32 
2009 food 449 4.57 0.89 2.62 0.36 0.37 0.27 
2010 food 747 4.42 0.98 2.44 0.31 0.38 0.31 
2011 food 337 5.27 1.19 2.44 0.52 0.32 0.16 
2012 food 25 7.19 1.15 3.41 0.28 0.32 0.40 
2013 food 808 4.85 1.01 2.43 0.35 0.39 0.26 
2014 food 343 6.23 1.36 2.32 0.41 0.44 0.15 
2015 food 342 5.34 1.04 2.48 0.30 0.37 0.32 
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Table 3.3: Variable summaries 
This table reports summaries for the variables that are determinants of return to capital. 
 Number Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Measures for access to finance 
Bank account 26424 0.856 1 0.351 
Line of credit 27420 0.404 0 0.491 
Fix asset finance 12353 0.234 0 0.366 
Work capital finance 25838 0.155 0 0.259 
Panel B: Measures for bureaucracy 
Time on government 26866 9.711 3 17.010 
Time on tax 27301 1.843 1 3.017 
Informal payment (%) 19132 1.062 0 3.318 
Panel C: Ownership 
Government  27634 0.010 0 0.101 
Foreign  27634 0.091 0 0.288 
Domestic  27634 0.892 1 0.311 
Panel D: Firm characteristics 
Age 27629 20.992 16 15.903 
Employment 27634 114.024 26 412.963 
Exporter 27599 0.143 0 0.350 
External audit 27464 0.519 1 0.500 
Female 26548 0.298 0 0.457 
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Table 3.4: Univariate analysis of return to capital 
This table presents univariate analysis results for return to capital. In each panel, I report the 
statistics for the logarithm of ARPK. I also report the statistics from paired t-tests for the 
differences. 
 Panel A: Bank account   Panel E: Time spent on gov 
  No Yes Diff    Low High Diff 
Mean 1.066 0.899 0.167  Mean 1.004 0.885 0.119 
Std. Err. 0.022 0.009 0.023  Std. Err. 0.014 0.017 0.022 
N 3,811 22,613 t=7.135  N 8,483 5,932 t= 5.315 
Panel B: Credit line  Panel F: Time spent on tax 
 No Yes    Low High  
Mean 0.978 0.883 0.095  Mean 0.982 0.907 0.075 
Std. Err. 0.01 0.012 0.016  Std. Err. 0.012 0.017 0.02 
N 16,329 11,091 t=5.886  N 11,532 5,982 t=3.598 
Panel C: Fix capital fin. by inst.   Panel G: Informal payment 
 Low High    Low High  
Mean 0.996 0.839 0.156  Mean 0.965 0.875 0.09 
Std. Err. 0.015 0.025 0.029  Std. Err. 0.01 0.022 0.024 
N 8,060 2,619 t=5.393  N 15,566 3,566 t=3.649 
Panel D: Work capital fin. by inst.      
 Low High       
Mean 0.953 0.942 0.01      
Std. Err. 0.01 0.016 0.019      
N 16,387 6,244 t=0.549           
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Table 3.5: Determinants of misallocation: Firm-level evidence 
This table presents regression results for the determinants of capital misallocation. The dependent 
variable is log(ARPK). P-values calculated based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels.  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bank Account -0.168*** -0.188***  -0.169*** -0.177*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003) 
Credit Line -0.076*** -0.126***  -0.106*** -0.151*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Fix Asset Finance  -0.101**   -0.147*** 
  (0.014)   (0.003) 
Work Capital Finance 0.056 0.073  0.069 0.099 
 (0.155) (0.196)  (0.153) (0.156) 
Time on government   -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 
   (0.001) (0.003) (0.494) 
Time on tax   -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.011** 
   (0.006) (0.001) (0.027) 
Informal payment   -0.008** -0.009** -0.012** 
   (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) 
Log(age) -0.050*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.046*** -0.085*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Log(employment) 0.068*** 0.059*** 0.072*** 0.088*** 0.065*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter 0.030 -0.019 0.035 0.041 0.019 
 (0.281) (0.613) (0.277) (0.219) (0.664) 
External Certificate -0.046** -0.012 -0.094*** -0.055** -0.031 
 (0.024) (0.702) (0.000) (0.027) (0.408) 
Female 0.033* 0.064** 0.035 0.037 0.078** 
 (0.096) (0.021) (0.127) (0.126) (0.022) 
Government  0.087 0.156 0.088 0.043 0.274* 
 (0.349) (0.189) (0.451) (0.713) (0.083) 
Foreign  0.048 0.020 0.042 0.019 -0.049 
 (0.141) (0.658) (0.268) (0.631) (0.345) 
Constant 1.250*** 1.664*** 1.100*** 1.168*** 1.612*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,397 10,399 17,986 16,233 7,088 
R-squared 0.061 0.069 0.072 0.069 0.088 
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Table 3.6: Asymmetric effects on misallocation: Firm-level evidence 
This table presents quantile regression results for the determinants of capital misallocation. The 
dependent variable is log(ARPK) at its 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles for columns (1) to 
(5), respectively. P-values calculated based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
Bank Account -0.140*** -0.128*** -0.145*** -0.228*** -0.286*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit Line -0.039 -0.077*** -0.078** -0.161*** -0.235*** 
 (0.134) (0.010) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) 
Work Capital Finance 0.037 0.026 0.059 0.092 0.228*** 
 (0.540) (0.592) (0.317) (0.179) (0.001) 
Time on government -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.162) (0.020) 
Time on tax -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.010** -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.111) (0.502) 
Informal payment -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.009** -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.047) (0.014) (0.136) 
Log(age) -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.064*** -0.056*** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.879) 
Log(employment) 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.094*** 0.109*** 0.135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter 0.043 0.061* 0.050 0.002 0.013 
 (0.142) (0.077) (0.211) (0.961) (0.831) 
External Certificate -0.049** -0.070** -0.067** -0.049 0.005 
 (0.041) (0.015) (0.028) (0.144) (0.879) 
Female -0.015 -0.011 0.011 0.111*** 0.124*** 
 (0.533) (0.700) (0.689) (0.001) (0.000) 
Government  -0.020 0.026 -0.050 0.067 0.009 
 (0.936) (0.588) (0.736) (0.777) (0.979) 
Foreign  -0.063 -0.018 0.046 0.012 0.038 
 (0.207) (0.688) (0.355) (0.834) (0.596) 
Constant -0.285*** 0.158 0.934*** 2.158*** 2.943*** 
 (0.001) (0.172) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,233 16,233 16,233 16,233 16,233 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0439 0.0425 0.0410 0.0441 0.0454 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of misallocation: Industry-level evidence 
This table presents regression results for the industry-level determinants of capital misallocation. 
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of firm level log(ARPK) within an industry in a 
country in a year. All the explanatory variables are also standard deviations of their firm level 
values within an industry in a country in a year. P-values calculated based on heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
S.D. of Bank Account 0.129* 0.133*  0.105 0.111 
 (0.057) (0.058)  (0.130) (0.123) 
S.D. of Credit Line -0.042 -0.012  -0.026 -0.002 
 (0.744) (0.926)  (0.841) (0.989) 
S.D. of Fix Asset Finance  -0.001   -0.001 
  (0.195)   (0.224) 
S.D. of Work Capital Finance 0.001 0.002  0.000 0.001 
 (0.641) (0.298)  (0.982) (0.610) 
S.D. of Time on government   0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 
   (0.076) (0.089) (0.030) 
S.D. of Time on tax   -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 
   (0.273) (0.216) (0.204) 
S.D. of Informal payment   0.014*** 0.012** 0.014** 
   (0.005) (0.025) (0.011) 
S.D. of Log(age) -0.056 -0.063 -0.077 -0.075 -0.090 
 (0.524) (0.482) (0.388) (0.413) (0.334) 
S.D. of Log(employment) 0.005 0.009 0.027 0.023 0.032 
 (0.915) (0.856) (0.558) (0.638) (0.513) 
S.D. of Exporter -0.046 -0.056 -0.060 -0.053 -0.063 
 (0.560) (0.482) (0.461) (0.526) (0.451) 
S.D. of External Certificate 0.100 0.103 0.105 0.098 0.096 
 (0.342) (0.331) (0.317) (0.355) (0.366) 
S.D. of Female -0.023 0.044 -0.115 -0.077 -0.002 
 (0.831) (0.699) (0.263) (0.511) (0.986) 
S.D. of Government  0.199* 0.174 0.161 0.154 0.135 
 (0.090) (0.149) (0.159) (0.182) (0.245) 
S.D. of Foreign  0.078 0.111 0.083 0.086 0.115 
 (0.318) (0.166) (0.297) (0.309) (0.182) 
Constant 1.219*** 1.182*** 1.230*** 1.210*** 1.163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 485 477 495 469 461 
R-squared 0.029 0.034 0.054 0.056 0.070 
 
